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29 May 1985

USSR REPORT

USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY

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EFFECTS OF MILITARY VULNERABILITY ON U.S. POLICY, PUBLIC OPINION

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[Article by Yu. A. Zamoshkin: "The Nuclear Threat and the Factor of Fear"]

[Text] The distinctive features of U.S. history have caused Americans to view and interpret their national security problems in certain specific ways. Sufficient evidence of this can be found in the fact that the military invulnerability of U.S. territory--that is, something that was only a dream or a strictly temporary state for the overwhelming majority of other nations--was an objective reality for Americans for 200 years and represented a constant and integral feature of their state's destiny, something "foreordained" by world history or a gift from God.

Confidence in the military invulnerability of U.S. territory was deeply ingrained in the minds and feelings of many generations and was not even shaken by the two world wars of our century. Furthermore, at the end of World War II this confidence grew even stronger when the United States built and used the atomic bomb. But the historical paradox was that it was precisely this bomb that marked the beginning of the Americans' loss of their firm belief in the military invulnerability of their territory; the development of nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles by the Soviet Union was of decisive significance in this process.

The loss of faith in military invulnerability aroused two kinds of ideological and psychological reactions in the United States.

The first was a more realistic and sober assessment of the change in circumstances--and it was quite a radical change--and the realization that the United States was now in the same position that other countries had always been in, including the Soviet Union. The development of political realism in the United States could and did lead to the acknowledgement of the fundamentally objective equality of the United States and the USSR in terms of military security and to a rational search for peaceful accords to secure a mutually guaranteed reduction of the threat of nuclear war.

The second type of reaction, which could be described as "neurotic," was connected with the psychological shock produced by the disintegration of

familiar beliefs about the world and the abrupt and dramatic development of feelings of fear about U.S. military vulnerability. For an understanding of the tenor of this type of psychological reaction, it is important to recall that it was born in the atmosphere of "cold war," which created a high level of tension in Soviet-American relations. This is also the reason why this new, unfamiliar and painful awareness of the nation's military vulnerability began to be associated with the USSR and its legitimate desire to bring its nuclear weapons up to the level of American weapons. This type of reaction can rightfully be called "neurotic" because it gave rise to morbid and irrational fears, confusion and even hysteria, which were widely used in the 1950's by McCarthyists and later by militant anticommunists and militarists.

The process by which this objectively created military vulnerability was recognized and experienced in the United States was a contradictory and irregular one. For example, the military defeat in Vietnam promoted the development of political realism and the recognition of the limits of U.S. military strength, the impossibility of securing the success of military ventures of this scale in today's world and the importance of peaceful agreements with the USSR (it was no coincidence that the United States took several important steps toward detente at that time). But the defeat in Vietnam--the first major military defeat in the nation's history--also led to the spread of "neurotic" feelings by giving many Americans a morbid and largely irrational sense of the general "military weakness" of the United States. And since this defeat was largely associated in the American mind with the USSR's assistance of Vietnam, this sense turned into feelings of "weakness" in comparison to the strength of the Soviet Union.

The sense of "military weakness" was strengthened by the events in Iran, when the United States was incapable of changing the course of events in spite of the strength of its armed forces. Furthermore, this "military impotence" was in sharp contrast to the "military decisiveness and strength" which Americans felt our country had demonstrated in connection with the situation in Afghanistan. American propaganda underscored these feelings, sensations and beliefs, using them to stimulate anti-Soviet attitudes.

These processes in the mass mentality were particularly intense in the 1970's, when the USSR secured a position of approximate equality in the military-strategic sphere. For those with more realistic political views, the approximate equality of nuclear arms looked like the optimal basis for mutually acceptable agreements with the USSR. But the development of political realism in the United States encountered serious difficulties.

Public opinion there was not immediately ready to realize the irreversibility of these objective historical changes. The mass mentality, to which the idea of the United States' equality to other countries was completely alien, regarded the balance of nuclear arms as a particularly unexpected and frightening situation. After all, this was not equality to some other country, but to the USSR, to a country whose economy, politics and ideology were viewed by Americans as a historic challenge to their own capitalist system. Furthermore, this was not only equality in the sphere of arms, but also in the extremely important sphere of science and technology, which in itself seemed an insult to the national pride of Americans, who had grown accustomed to

feeling unsurpassed in science and technology. This was a situation--and this deserves emphasis--of fundamental equality in the conditions of the potential military vulnerability of the United States (and the USSR) in the event of war, and not just any war, but nuclear war, with its horribly destructive impact. The fear, confusion and injured national pride of some Americans reached a high level of intensity and combined to make up the psychological basis for a "neurotic" state of mind.

The advocates of militarism took advantage of this state of mind to justify, according to old American traditions, plans for the further buildup of nuclear weapons with alarming allegations that the United States was "lagging behind" the USSR in this sphere. Furthermore, they made active use of the fact that the "neurotic" state of mind, which is distinguished in general by abrupt changes from a state of self-confidence and euphoria to a state of depression and even panic, interpreted the move away from the United States' earlier nuclear superiority to nuclear equality as a "downward move" and a move toward "inferiority." The mind which was still in a state of shock as a result of the discovery of U.S. military vulnerability was inclined to notice only the increase in Soviet armed strength and interpret this as a symptom of U.S. "military weakness" in comparison to the USSR. Whereas a stable majority of Americans (56 percent on the average) expressed the certainty that their country was militarily superior to the USSR in public opinion polls in the 1960's, in 1980 more than half of the Americans (68 percent) already believed that the USSR was stronger than the United States in the military sphere. There was a corresponding increase in the number of Americans (78 percent) expressing serious worries about this state of affairs.² This is the reason for the "overreaction" of U.S. public opinion in the late 1970's to the militarist demagoguery promising to close the "window of vulnerability" and demanding a significant increase in military spending for this purpose.

It was not until the middle of 1981 that the panic connected with the belief in the supposed U.S. military lag began to subside. By 1984 these feelings had gradually begun to give way to more realistic assessments of the comparative nuclear strength of the two countries. Between 1982 and 1984 there was a substantial decrease (up to 27 percent) in the number of Americans believing in the U.S. lag and a twofold increase (up to 57 percent) in the number believing that the nuclear weapons of the USSR and the United States were approximately equal.³

It is indicative that American attitudes toward military spending changed according to the same patterns and within the same time frame as their beliefs about comparative U.S. and Soviet strength. For example, in the 1950's, during the period of panic in the United States as a result of the loss of the nuclear monopoly, there was an abrupt increase in the number of those who wanted to increase the military budget and believed that too little was being spent on military needs (64 percent). Later in the 1960's the number of people expressing these wishes and opinions decreased (only 8 percent in 1969). In the 1970's, on the other hand, the number began to rise again. The rise in the number of Americans supporting an increase in military spending was particularly intensive after 1977, coinciding with the spread of rumors about the "military lag." In 1980 the number of Americans supporting

a swollen military budget reached the highest level since the start of the war in Vietnam--74 percent.⁴ Public opinion then began to change in the opposite direction in 1981. By the beginning of 1984 there was a significant decrease in the number supporting increased military spending (21 percent) and an increase in the number advocating the maintenance of the current level of spending (40 percent) and even in the number advocating cuts in military spending (32 percent).

The comparison of the two sets of figures (American evaluations of the comparative military strength of the USSR and United States and attitudes toward defense spending) suggests a definite connection in this area. Apparently, the increase in the number of Americans worried about the U.S. military lag is connected with the increase in support for higher military expenditures.

Of course, this connection should not be regarded as an absolute. The substantial decrease in the number supporting a larger military budget in 1982-1984 should apparently be interpreted with a view to the fact that the Reagan Administration had already inflated the military budget dramatically in 1980-1981 and increased it later. Besides this, the idea of higher military spending was supported less and less by a public disturbed by economic difficulties, the growing budget deficit and the fear that higher military spending could lead to cuts in social spending.

Nevertheless, we can probably assume that a truly substantial and steady decrease in the number of Americans supporting a larger military budget can be secured only if the frightening idea of a military lag is destroyed and if equality in the sphere of nuclear arms is viewed as a reality and the optimal condition for peaceful coexistence and the reduced danger of nuclear war.

It is indicative that the fluctuations in the dynamics of American public evaluations of the comparative nuclear strength of the United States and USSR coincided to some extent with the fluctuations in the dynamics of support for efforts to achieve military superiority. The "neurotic" sense of national "military inferiority" and the fear engendered by "military vulnerability" were still seeking psychological assurance in the hope of restoring nuclear superiority--a naive and already virtually impossible hope but one which is still widely cherished in the United States.

For example, in the late 1970's and early 1980's the belief in the military lag was combined with the hope that the United States could not only surmount this lag but also secure military superiority. This was the case until 1981, when 68 percent expressed the opinion that the United States was weaker than the USSR and 54 percent⁵ believed that the United States should make every effort to become stronger than the Soviet Union in the military sense. During the same years the overwhelming majority (73 percent as compared to 22 percent) essentially agreed with the aim of superiority, expressing the hope that the United States would become the "number-one power" in the nuclear sphere.⁶

In 1981, however, when the number of Americans believing in the U.S. military lag began to decrease and the number acknowledging approximate equality began

to increase, attitudes toward the objective of military superiority also changed. In 1983, when Americans were asked whether the United States should be stronger than the Soviet Union or whether the balance of power should be maintained, more than half (54 percent) already supported the maintenance of the balance of power and less than half (46 percent) felt that the United States should be stronger than the Soviet Union.⁷

Apparently, we can assume that the adaptation of the mass mentality to the fact of approximate equality and, what is even more important, the waning of the morbid emotions engendered by the belief in the "military lag" helped to make the idea of "military superiority" less psychologically appealing to Americans. Of course, the realization of the difficulty and absolute impossibility of securing military superiority played an important role. In May 1984, 92 percent already agreed with the following statement: "If we had greater nuclear potential than the USSR, they would simply continue building missiles until they had overtaken us."⁸

The political effects of this shift in U.S. public opinion were diverse and contradictory. In the mind inclined toward more realistic political views, the disappearance of the belief in the possibility of achieving strategic superiority was promoted by the realization that the fear of nuclear war, which would inevitably grow along with the growth of nuclear missiles, could be the catalyst in the struggle to stop the arms race and to bring about mutual and mutually beneficial arms reductions. In the "neurotic" mind, the loss of the hope of nuclear superiority frequently only promoted a greater fear of nuclear war and a general sense of the "military vulnerability" of the United States in the event of such a war, and this sense could engender various political attitudes and positions.

On the one hand, the substantially increased fear of nuclear war and U.S. military vulnerability in this kind of war--in combination with the anti-Soviet propaganda fueling negative feelings about the USSR and frightening people with the Soviet "military threat"--could and did motivate many Americans to support the administration's militarist programs and its hard line of using military force and threats of force. It is no coincidence that R. Reagan and his cabinet took such great pains to frighten people with the myth of the "Soviet military threat."

On the other hand, the same feelings of fear of nuclear war could stimulate an antimilitarist movement after they reached a certain level of pervasiveness, intensity and urgency. Fear could stimulate a desire for a nuclear freeze, the limitation of U.S. and Soviet nuclear arms and peaceful agreements with the Soviet Union for these purposes. The fear of a horribly destructive nuclear war could play a sobering role with regard to adventurist power politics. It could also lead to greater caution in the use of threats of force against other countries, especially the USSR.

The facts testify that the U.S. administration's policy of escalating fear began to produce results which were the opposite of those desired by 1982. It was no coincidence that just before the Pershing-II and cruise missiles were deployed in Europe in 1983, and especially after the deployment began

and the talks with the USSR were broken off, Ronald Reagan tried to pacify both the Americans and the Europeans who were disturbed by the implications of these actions. He began to use "peaceable" statements along with his customary remarks about the "Soviet military threat" with increasing frequency.

But the "factor of fear" of nuclear war and U.S. vulnerability in such a war could apparently stimulate the antimilitarist feelings of Americans and their desire for peaceful agreements and the normalization of relations with the USSR only under certain conditions. One of these conditions was the destruction of the illusion that the United States could reach a certain level of development in nuclear power and antimissile systems which would actually reduce the risk of a nuclear war or save the Americans in the event of a war.

There is reason to believe that the symptoms of the gradual destruction of this illusion are present in the United States. For example, there was no truly broad public support for the idea of "limited" nuclear war. By 1982, 75 percent of the Americans already felt that any use of nuclear weapons would lead to world war.⁹ In 1984, 83 percent agreed with the statement that "the idea of limited nuclear war is ridiculous and the use of nuclear weapons by any of the superpowers will lead to total nuclear war."¹⁰

Pessimistic feelings about the possibility of surviving a nuclear conflict led more and more Americans to disillusionment with civil defense programs. For example, in 1982 the majority (61 percent) called the Pentagon's plans for the evacuation of American cities unrealistic; 71 percent already agreed with the statement that "the idea of building up civil defense is a dangerous illusion" in 1984.¹¹

It is no secret that Ronald Reagan began to assure the public in 1983 that the United States could evade nuclear destruction by establishing a space-based ABM system. Obviously, the dangerous nature of propaganda efforts of this kind, portraying the militarization of space and the development of new and more powerful weapon systems as a purely "defensive" undertaking, must not be underestimated. As numerous polls indicate, however, the talk about a space-based ABM system did not reduce the Americans' fear of nuclear war.¹²

The actual level of this fear is attested to by the increased number of Americans expressing pessimistic views regarding the future development of international relations in the direction of peace. By the end of 1981 only 12 percent believed that the next year, 1982, would be peaceful. This belief stayed approximately the same in subsequent years. A survey conducted in 26 countries at the end of 1982 showed that Americans were more inclined than other nationalities to believe that a war would start in the next decade. In terms of the degree of pessimism with regard to prospects for lasting peace, Americans ranked almost first, surpassed only by the Colombians. In 1984, 38 percent of the Americans felt that total nuclear war was probable within the next 10 years (the figure was even higher among young Americans--50 percent); and 55 percent (72 percent of the young) said that they "think about nuclear war more today than 5 years ago."¹³

Despite the pervasive propaganda implying that Reagan's militarist undertakings and hard line in relations with the USSR will guarantee the prevention

of war, the number of Americans worried that Reagan's behavior could start a new war has increased substantially in recent years. When Americans were asked, "Are you afraid (regardless of your feelings about the President in general) that Reagan could involve us in a war?" in January 1983, 34 percent answered in the affirmative, but the figure was already 40 percent in April. Ever since October 1983 Reagan has invariably received the lowest performance evaluations on his ability to keep the United States out of war. At the beginning of 1984 the majority (63 percent as compared to 34 percent)¹⁴ agreed that Reagan's reelection would push the country even further toward war. In an August 1984 poll, 42 percent expressed the worry that President Reagan could involve the country in a new war.¹⁵

Since 1982 the Reagan Administration's performance in nuclear arms limitation talks with the USSR has invariably received a negative evaluation from the majority of Americans (60 percent on the average). The number of people advocating talks, however, has increased. In July 1984, 90 percent already supported the idea of a bilateral nuclear arms reduction agreement with the USSR; 80 percent were in favor of an underground nuclear test ban treaty; 82 percent were in favor of an agreement prohibiting the use of weapons in outer space.¹⁶

In 1984, 96 percent of the Americans expressed the opinion that peaceful, and not military, solutions are more necessary now than ever before, and 85 percent agreed with the statement, "Whatever our differences, we and the Soviet Union must not ever resort to war." These opinions and attitudes are quite understandable, as 89 percent of the Americans are already convinced that there can be no winner in a nuclear war, and 83 percent are not even certain that this kind of war will not end all life on earth.¹⁷

It is indicative that the fear of nuclear war could reach such a level that it could stimulate the promotion of peaceful agreements with the USSR, even when combined with the belief in the U.S. "military lag." Some facts testify that even among the people who still feel that the United States is lagging behind the USSR in the military sphere and therefore support in principle the idea of compounding American military efforts for the sake of "keeping up with Soviet military strength," the percentage wanting negotiations and normal relations with the USSR is no lower than the national average (84 percent of them support arms control talks, 75 percent support the resumption of cultural and educational contacts and 70 percent support joint efforts in the resolution of energy problems).¹⁸

Authoritative public opinion polls in the United States testify quite conclusively that the fear of nuclear war can "work" as an incentive for peaceful agreements with the USSR even when respondents' overall feelings about the Soviet Union are negative, which is not surprising under the conditions of mass-scale anti-Soviet propaganda.

In view of the anti-Soviet prejudices of the Americans polled and their clear desire for the normalization of Soviet-American relations, we can assume that this desire is not connected with their general ideological and emotional attitude toward our country, but stems primarily from worries about the danger of nuclear war. This conclusion seems all the more valid if we

consider that the desire for the normalization and improvement of Soviet-American relations has grown stronger in just the last few years--that is, precisely when the intensification of anti-Soviet propaganda in the United States was accompanied by the more extensive acceptance of the anti-Soviet stereotypes engendered by this propaganda.

Of course, anti-Soviet biases and prejudices cultivated in the public mind are ultimately certain to be a serious factor inhibiting the overall relaxation of tension in Soviet-American relations and the transformation of detente into a truly thorough and irreversible process. Even in the presence of a steady desire for peaceful negotiations and agreements with the USSR in the public mind, these stereotypes and prejudices will allow the administration to deceive the masses by blaming the Soviet Union for the disruption of negotiations.

Anti-Soviet stereotypes and biases will also inhibit the further consolidation of peaceful forces in the United States. Of course, when the actual political impact of anti-Soviet stereotypes and biases is evaluated, it must be borne in mind that they exist and "work" primarily on the level of general ideological cliches and symbols and the emotions related to these; U.S. public opinion, on the other hand, is frequently inclined to base its attitudes toward specific issues less on ideology than on practical considerations. It is precisely this practical considerations and common sense that tell the Americans that peaceful agreements with the USSR are necessary today, at this time of the dangerous escalation of tension and the accumulation of huge nuclear weapon stockpiles. Nevertheless, the future prospects for an overall shift in the balance of power in the United States between militarist, adventurist groups and politically realistic and peaceful groups will depend largely on the intensity of the proliferation of anti-Soviet stereotypes and prejudices. But the same prospects will also depend, and also to a considerable extent, on the nature and intensity of the fear of the real danger of nuclear war.

Up to this point, we have cited data on American public opinion in general to demonstrate the overall effect of the "fear factor" on the American approach to Soviet-American relations. We can assume, however, that various types of connections between the "fear factor" and certain ideological and political attitudes exist in the minds of specific individuals.

Modern computers can aid in revealing the main differences between these types of connections. This is done by means of something called "cluster analysis," during the course of which the computer categorizes respondents according to certain characteristic combinations of views they express on various issues.

An interesting example of the use of public opinion "cluster analysis" can be found in a 1984 study by researchers from the Public Agenda Foundation in collaboration with the Brown University Center for Foreign Policy Development.¹⁹ The results of this study are important to us because the level of fear and anxiety with regard to nuclear war was the main parameter used in the categorization of respondents. The second parameter was the level of anti-Soviet ideological biases and prejudices. The third and fourth parameters recorded

different approaches to nuclear arms issues and Soviet-American relations. The computers then classified respondents according to the combinations of their opinions, views and positions on all four parameters. There were four such groups.

The first group was made up of Americans who displayed a level of anti-Soviet biases higher than the national average and a lower level of fear and anxiety about nuclear war. For example, whereas only 8 percent of these people felt that nuclear war was probable in the next 10 years, the national average was 38 percent. Twice as many of these people believed in the possibility of surviving a nuclear war. Whereas the majority (68 percent) of all respondents believed that an unrestrained nuclear arms race in the absence of peaceful agreements would lead to nuclear war in itself, only a minority (19 percent) of the members of this group agreed with this statement.

For this reason, it is not surprising that the factor of ideological hatred for the USSR was dominant in the minds of those in the first group. It was precisely this, and not the "factor of fear" of nuclear war, that had the main effect on their political approach to Soviet-American relations. For example, the members of this group were more willing to view the relations between our countries as relations of total confrontation played by the rules of a "no-win game"; they were inclined to interpret any infringement of Soviet interests as a U.S. victory. They were more likely than the entire group of respondents to prefer the hard line and power politics in relations with the USSR and to support the continued buildup of nuclear weapons. By the same token, they were less inclined to support a nuclear freeze.

According to the calculations of the organizers of this study, this group represents approximately 23 percent of all respondents (naturally the results of these calculations are largely hypothetical). As for the sociodemographic features of the group, the majority of its members were men (69 percent) and people of more advanced years (this group had the highest percentage of people over 61). Unfortunately, the researchers did not learn the class, social-group and demographic affiliations of the respondents. They confine themselves to the statement that the majority in this group, as might be expected, were conservatives (four times as many conservatives as liberals).

The respondents in the second group were distinguished by a fundamentally different relationship between the "fear factor" and the "ideological factor"--that is, the level of anti-Soviet ideological biases. Therefore, approaches to Soviet-American relations were also different.

The second group was made up of people with a higher level of anxiety about the danger of nuclear war, those who regard this as a real danger demanding immediate action. This group had the highest percentage of people who "think more about nuclear war now than 5 years ago" (73 percent, with a national average of 55 percent). They also had a higher level of awareness that there will be no winners in a nuclear war (93 percent). The percentage believing that war is probable in the next 10 years was also higher than the average--45 percent of the group (with a national average of 38 percent). At the same time, the members of this group demonstrated minimal anti-Soviet biases

and prejudices in comparison to other groups. Furthermore, they believed less in the myth of the "Soviet threat" than other groups.

Therefore, the specific views of this group on the issue of Soviet-American relations were influenced more by the "factor of fear" of nuclear war than by the factor of anti-Sovietism. This group's support for the idea of establishing principles of friendship and mutual interest in Soviet-American relations was higher than the average. The majority in the second group (73 percent) were even willing to "take the risk of establishing friendly and mutually acceptable relations with the USSR, even if this should increase communism's strength in the world" (in the nation at large they represented only a minority of 38 percent). This group had a higher percentage of people advocating the cessation of the nuclear arms race, and 93 percent of the members of this group support a nuclear freeze.

The second group, which unites, according to the researchers' calculations, around 21 percent of all respondents, is made up mostly of young people and people with a higher education. The percentage of men is slightly higher in this group. The majority call themselves liberals and vote for Democrats.

The third group, the largest (31 percent of all respondents), unites Americans with a much more contradictory frame of mind. The majority of these people accept the stereotypes of anticommunist propaganda and the rumors about the "Soviet threat," rumors which have been spread so judiciously in the United States in the 1980's. The majority also prefer peaceful negotiations based on mutual interests and even friendly relations with the USSR to forcible pressure, however, because they are afraid of a nuclear conflict. Furthermore, this fear is somewhat more intense in this group than in the total group of respondents. For example, 95 percent of the members of this group (89 percent in the total group) agreed that there can be no winners in a nuclear war; 82 percent (68 percent in the total group) agreed that the continuation of the endless nuclear arms race in the absence of peaceful arms limitation agreements will lead sooner or later to a nuclear conflict; 41 percent, as compared to 38 percent in the nation at large, regard war as probable in the next 10 years; 65 percent think more about nuclear war now than they did 5 years ago (with a national average of 55 percent), and so forth.

Under the influence of the "fear factor," these Americans display certain elements of political realism in their choice of a position on practical aspects of Soviet-American relations in spite of their fairly high level of ideological hatred and mistrust of the USSR. It is no coincidence that the organizers of the research call them "pragmatists acknowledging the danger of nuclear war." In this group, 69 percent felt that the United States should be guided by the rule of "live and let live" in relations with the USSR. They were less inclined than the total group (30 percent as compared to 47 percent) to support the further escalation of the arms race. The nuclear freeze was supported by 71 percent (with an average indicator of 61 percent). Women are in the majority in this group (60 percent). The young outnumber the elderly. The majority are people with a secondary education and people who define their political position as midway between conservative and liberal. Apparently, there is reason to believe that the

obviously contradictory frame of mind characteristic of this group is quite typical of U.S. public opinion today.

The Americans in the fourth group are least likely to be observed by public opinion experts, in the opinion of the organizers of this study, although they represent around 25 percent of the total.

The members of this group are distinguished by an extremely high level of ideological prejudices against the USSR. They are most inclined to believe Reagan's anti-Soviet talk about the Soviet Union as the "evil empire" and the source of all U.S. troubles and problems. Furthermore, they define their hatred for the USSR and socialist ideas in the terms of religious fundamentalism and rigorism. In the opinion of the organizers of the research, the Americans in this group are distinguished by a tendency to "maximize the Soviet threat" on the ideological and military levels. In view of all this, we could assume that this group would be unconditionally inclined to support a more aggressive, militarist and forcible line in relations with the USSR, but this is not exactly true. The belief in the myth of the "Soviet threat" is so strong in this case that the overwhelming majority of group members (77 percent in comparison to the average of 40 percent) expressed the certainty that the United States will have to use nuclear weapons against the USSR sooner or later "to stop communism."

But this reveals the extremely peculiar but psychologically understandable logic of the internal development of the group's characteristic thoughts and feelings. The fear of the "Soviet threat" becomes fear of a nuclear conflict with the USSR, and the "maximization of the communist menace" leads to the "maximization" of the danger of nuclear war. And in fact the level of fear and anxiety about the possibility and even the probability of nuclear war is higher in this group than the average for all respondents. Here the majority (57 percent) regard war in the next 10 years as a probability (only a minority of the total group expressed this opinion--38 percent). And 95 percent (in comparison to the national average of 89 percent) were certain that there could be no winners in a nuclear war.

This results in an extremely contradictory frame of mind, which supports programs for the continued buildup of U.S. nuclear potential (the percentage wanting the United States to become "stronger" than the USSR in the nuclear sphere is higher than the national average) and simultaneously prefers peaceful agreements with the USSR to brutal pressure. This preference was expressed by a higher percentage than in any other group--74 percent (in comparison to 63 percent for the total group). The members of this group are least willing to take the "risk" of establishing friendly relations with the USSR in the fear that this will strengthen communism in the world, but they are more likely to acknowledge that the United States is not making enough effort to reach peaceful agreements with the USSR.

An analysis of the frame of mind characteristic of the fourth group is quite interesting because it proves that the fear of nuclear war and the related hope of agreements with the USSR can be accompanied or even caused by the anti-Soviet propaganda frightening Americans with the "Soviet military threat."

An analysis of these data proves that the "fear factor" can impede the dangerous slide of the U.S. foreign policy line in relations with the USSR toward adventurism. The members of rightwing conservative groups who constantly talk about the "USSR's desire to impose its ways on the United States through the use of force or nuclear blackmail" are often able to direct the feeling of fear into the channel of "nationalist-heroic," jingoist bravado. Then the majority of respondents in specially conducted polls declare, "Better dead than Red." Although the percentage of American declarations of this type fluctuates, it remains quite high. Of course, declarations of this type (they are usually a deliberately provoked response--a reaction to a tendentiously worded question containing the slanderous allegation about the existing "danger of a Soviet takeover of the United States") do not necessarily signify the respondent's actual willingness to act accordingly in a real crisis. But the existence of these feelings is something that would be wrong and even dangerous to ignore.

An extremely indicative example of the manipulation of the fear of nuclear war was provided by Secretary of State G. Shultz and Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger in their statements when the movie "The Day After" was shown on television in fall 1983. This movie, which was made by antiwar groups in the United States and graphically portrayed the horrors of nuclear war, strengthened American fears about the possibility of such a war. Polls taken before the movie was shown indicated that although the majority of Americans regarded nuclear war as a real danger, a high percentage were trying to "forget" it. After the movie was shown, 88 percent said that they were seriously disturbed by the nuclear threat, and only 10 percent still preferred to "forget" it. The increased worry about the danger of nuclear war was reflected in the rise of 12 percent in the number of people supporting nuclear arms control after the movie had been shown.

In this atmosphere, G. Shultz and C. Weinberger tried to manipulate public opinion and simultaneously take advantage of the fear of nuclear war. Shultz, for example, called the film a "brilliant and dramatic portrayal of the absolute unacceptability of nuclear war," and he then tried to prove that Republican administration policy had supposedly been successful in preventing a war. Weinberger tried to take advantage of the film's intensification of fear to popularize programs for the buildup of nuclear arms and the development of ABM systems as "reinforcing mechanisms for the deterrence" of nuclear war and the guarantee of "defense during the war." Weinberger simultaneously appealed to the patriotism of Americans.

This is why theoretical analyses, ideological and psychological efforts and propaganda which might help to neutralize the manipulative efforts of militarists and chauvinists in the United States are so important today. This activity should lay a foundation of political realism under the fear of nuclear war. Above all, it would contribute to the more accurate and thorough understanding of the actual scales of the danger of this kind of war, all of its destructive implications and the actual possibilities and ways of reducing the danger of a nuclear conflict. In addition, it would develop the ability to distinguish more clearly between the enemies and friends of peace.

This kind of activity presupposes the transfer of the fear of nuclear war from the channel of anticommunism and anti-Sovietism to the channel of anti-militarism, from the channel of jingoism, representing a hybrid of chauvinism, global "imperious" ambitions and a national inferiority complex, to the channel of genuine patriotism and the realization that genuine national interests demand peaceful agreements on an equal basis. Today it is also extremely important to inhibit the psychological mechanisms which artificially reduce the intensity of--or, in psychological terms, "block"--the fear that is engendered naturally, spontaneously and on a mass scale by the real danger of nuclear war. One element of this "blockade" is the deliberately "calming," "optimistic" rhetoric of the U.S. administration.

Militarist groups can also "block" the fear of nuclear war by artificially arousing other feelings and causing them to take precedence in the human mind. One such feeling, for example, could be the sense of nationalism frustrated in its ambitions. Others could be the feelings connected with the fundamental differences between the U.S. and Soviet socioeconomic and political systems. It is known that the administration in Washington artificially stirred up emotions about these differences, particularly the different interpretations of "human rights" in the USSR and the United States, to "block" the fear of nuclear war and divert American attention away from the foreign policy and military actions that actually intensified this danger.

Polls indicate that many Americans are extremely worried about the danger of a nuclear conflict but are simultaneously trying to forget this danger and not think about it. This reflects the workings of a special "psychological defense mechanism," with the aid of which the most painful feelings can be removed from the conscious mind. But the painful feelings often do not cease to exist, but simply move from the conscious mind into the unconscious mind. Deprived of the control provided by the intellect, they become a blind irrational force and a force often destructive to the mind. This is often the case with the fear of nuclear war.

This submersion of fear can have the following results:

Internal stress and anxiety engendering a taste for various types of drugs; deep-seated mental disorders and frustration evolving into neuroses and psychoses;

The accumulation of internal unfocused irritation, general bitterness and stronger aggressive impulses: As a blind and irrational force, these feelings can be directed at objects having no relationship to the source of the painful feelings;

Despair, alienation, impotence, apathy and so forth.

Today American intellectuals involved in the struggle for peace, especially psychologists, psychiatrists, physicians and educators, are growing increasingly aware of the significance of these problems and the importance of purposeful work to help people experiencing an intense fear of nuclear war to turn this fear from a destroyer of the mind into a means of mobilizing the

energetic defense of peace. Studies in the United States provide interesting data about the influence of the mounting danger of nuclear war on the human mind, especially in children and adolescents. A broad range of educational and psychotherapeutic undertakings are being organized to serve the cause of peace.

In this context, particularly noteworthy efforts have been made by John Mack, a Harvard professor and the head of the special project of the American Psychiatric Association; Benina Berger, Evie Eden and Jeffrey Gould from California, the heads of the "Atomic Ecology Project"; Joanna Macy, the organizer of psychotherapeutic seminars and courses throughout the country, and others.²⁰ The work of these groups and dozens of others like them warrant special analysis. For now, we can only make one general statement about them: They are focusing on the psychological, psychiatric and psychotherapeutic aspects of the nuclear threat's effects on the human being and are not paying enough attention to the need to elucidate and solve actual political problems. An awareness of the significance of specific proposals capable of reducing the danger of nuclear war and the involvement of people in the struggle to implement these proposals would have a psychotherapeutic and a political impact.

In this context, the political and propaganda significance of Soviet proposals and peace initiatives is indisputable, but unfortunately the American public is usually not sufficiently informed about these.

FOOTNOTES

1. The data cited here and later in the article were derived from public opinion polls conducted by the most respected and authoritative American organizations specializing in this field. Although the author is well aware of the relative and limited nature of data of this type, he nevertheless believes that they can serve as a point of departure for a study of the U.S. public mind if they are approached with sufficient discernment and, what is most important, are analyzed systematically and in depth.
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3. "Voter Options on Nuclear Arms Policy," The Public Agenda Foundation in Collaboration with the Center for Foreign Policy Development, Providence (R.I.), 1984, p 20.
4. FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 1980, No 3, p 706.
5. NEWSWEEK, 8 June 1981, p 14.
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8. "Voter Options on Nuclear Arms Policy," p 24.

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10. "Voter Options on Nuclear Arms Policy," p 24.
11. Ibid., p 34.
12. "Harris Survey," 14 April 1983; 28 June 1984.
13. "Voter Options on Nuclear Arms Policy," pp 20, 22.
14. "Harris Survey," 16 January 1984.
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17. "Voter Options on Nuclear Arms Policy," p 25.
18. "American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy," edited by J. Rielly, Chicago, 1983, p 15.
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CAPITALIST STATES' SEARCH FOR INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION VIEWED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 85 (signed to press 15 Feb 85) pp 27-39

[Article by A. I. Shapiro: "Contradictions of International State-Monopolist Economic Regulation"]

[Text] The developed capitalist countries have attempted to regulate economic processes on the international level during the postwar period, and these attempts have been stepped up in the past 10-15 years. The economic processes and international economic relations of imperialist countries and their domestic and foreign economic policies, particularly their commercial and technological contacts with socialist and developing states, are beginning to be influenced by state-monopolist regulation.

The gradual development of a system of state-monopolist regulation for the world capitalist economy is one of the significant signs of centripetal tendencies in inter-imperialist relations, making the "inevitable alliance of all imperialists"¹ a reality. Its objective basis is the "law of class interests and the class policy of the bourgeoisie."² Furthermore, the increasing strength of socialism, the international working class and the national liberation movement has been accompanied by increasingly perceptible attempts by the monopolistic bourgeoisie of various countries to act in common.

Now that the conflict between the two world social systems and two opposite outlooks has taken on unprecedented dimensions, American imperialism is trying to use state-monopolist economic regulation on the international level in concerted attacks on socialism and in attempts to shift the approximate military-strategic balance between the USSR and the United States in its own favor. It is striving to exploit the general tendency toward unification for its own imperious, ambitious purposes. In connection with this, the United States is exerting stronger economic and political pressure on its allies in Western Europe and Japan. This is why the prevailing centripetal tendency in inter-imperialist relations today objectively includes the inevitability of heated rivalry, conflicts and fierce competition among the three centers of imperialism.

Natural Laws Governing Highly Developed Capitalism

The foundations for the international system of state-monopolist economic regulation have been laid within the capitalist countries. The search for

new forms and methods of regulation in the United States and other countries is not related directly to the dynamics of the reproductive cycle, although it grows more intense when economic conditions grow worse. The general tendency, despite frequent fluctuations in the economic policies of governments, is the increasing supplementation, and in some cases the outright replacement, of natural market regulators of reproduction with centralized regulation.

There is a contradictory dialectical connection between economic competition and economic planning in the capitalist economy. Competition is still the main mechanism for the spontaneous regulation of production patterns in accordance with the law of value, but capitalist economic plans and the regulations, programs and indicators governing them have also become an integral part of economic management under the conditions of highly developed state-monopolist capitalism.

The tendency toward economic planning and the limitation of spontaneous market developments is not confined within state boundaries. It is crossing them, although timidly. The regulation of processes occurring in the world capitalist economy and affecting the entire system of capitalist intergovernmental relations and economic contacts is developing in more complex and contradictory and less mature forms than in the national economy.

The world capitalist economy is supplementing the antagonism between classes, conflicts between individual groups of capital and reproductive imbalances within states with antagonism between the imperialist and newly liberated countries and with economic and political rivalry between imperialist centers, states and monopolies in various forms and on various levels. The conflict between the nation and the transnational corporation is growing increasingly acute. For example, the American TNC's, which are stronger in the economic sense than many states, ignore their national regulations, destabilize their economies and compound anarchy throughout the world capitalist economy. Conflicts between the domestic and foreign economic policies of individual countries and the coordinated policy of imperialist ruling circles are also growing more frequent. This indicates that state-monopolist capitalism does not eradicate spontaneous market forces in individual countries, in integrated groups of countries or in the world capitalist economy as a whole.

Nevertheless, in their struggle against socialism and all anti-imperialist forces, the bourgeoisie and its political spokesmen, invested with governmental power, are seeking ways of alleviating conflicts, reaching agreements and organizing joint actions and multilateral cooperation. International regulation simultaneously reflects the conditions of international financial capital's exploitation of the working class and non-proletarian laboring strata in the capitalist countries and the peoples of former colonies on the regional and global economic levels.

The relationship between production anarchy and the tendency toward regulation in the world capitalist economy is important for an understanding of the processes in this economy and in the leading imperialist countries, especially the United States, and for the disclosure of their probable economic prospects. It is not surprising that economists in the United States and other

capitalist countries are paying close attention to this matter. Questions of state-monopolist regulation of national economies and international economic relations are being debated by representatives of the Keynesian and neo-classical, especially monetarist, currents of bourgeois political economy, neoliberal reformism and conservatism.

In this way, the dilemma posed by bourgeois political economy--which can be summarized as a choice between state intervention in economic affairs, their regulation and programming, or the free play of market forces--has now taken on global dimensions, but both the free market economy and free competition entered the realm of legend when capitalism entered the monopolist stage. Whereas competition, in K. Marx' words, evokes "wails from the capitalists themselves for competition on equal terms--that is, for equal boundaries for the exploitation of labor,"³ the monopoly, which exists on the same level with competition and above it, will not reconcile itself to competition on equal terms in the domestic or world markets. The return from monopolist competition to "free" and "honest" competition and the natural tendencies of pre-monopolist capitalism is nothing other than a reactionary utopian dream of bourgeois neoromanticists, or, as V. I. Lenin, wrote, "petty bourgeois reactionary criticism of capitalist imperialism."⁴ State-monopolist regulation of the economic process is not the result of the wishes of specific individuals, but an irreversible natural tendency arising from the objective requirements of the development of contemporary productive forces.

For this reason, we could hardly agree with the statements about the current "tendency toward limited government interference" and about the hope of saving capitalism by reviving the automatic market substructure of the economic mechanism. Even in such countries as the United States and England, and partially in the FRG and Japan, where reactionary conservative views on economic development triumphed in the early 1980's, even the "partial dismantling of state-monopolist capitalism," which is written about at times, did not actually take place, despite the verbal tightrope-walking of their leaders. The reprivatization of some industries in England, for example, has been compensated, or even overcompensated, for by increased government intrusions in other spheres of the economy.

In general, in the system of imperialist countries, regardless of the currently prevailing form of government intervention--whether direct or indirect--there is a strong desire for the regulation and coordination of economic policy and strategy. It is true that new and untried national systems of state-monopolist regulation are engaged in a far from uniform intensive search for access to the international level. This reflects, in addition to other processes, the increasing awareness that one of the important causes of the fiasco of neo-Keynesian models of state regulation was their "national restriction," which did not consider the increasing dependence of domestic capital accumulations on foreign economic factors, the failure of these models to adapt to the new degree of internationalization of productive forces and the beginning of the structural reorganization of the world capitalist economy.

Which factors have intensified the tendency toward the consolidation of contemporary capitalism's economic forces in the postwar decades? There are several such factors.

Above all, there is the far-reaching process of the internationalization of capital and production. It is responsible for the increasing interdependence of national economies, industries and individual corporations and their strong dependence on foreign markets and therefore objectively requires the internationalization of the management of productive forces. On the international level this is a need as natural as the monopoly-engendered government involvement in domestic economic affairs. Analyzing the contradiction engendered by the joint-stock company, K. Marx wrote that "in some spheres this leads to a monopoly and therefore requires government intervention."⁵

The lack of correspondence between this requirement and the actual capabilities of capitalism with its private and state-monopolist property relations and domestic and international cataclysms is one of the reasons for the exacerbation of conflicts in the world capitalist economy. It is no wonder that when the heads of state and government of the seven leading capitalist countries met in Venice in summer 1980 and in Ottawa a year later, they indirectly acknowledged by severity of these conflicts by stating, literally in the same words, that the stability of the world economy, on which the successful development of each country is founded, depends on all concerned states and on the mutual acknowledgement of their needs and obligations.

The need for the intergovernmental regulation of world economic processes also stems from the common effects and severity of global problems and many other economic problems compounding the unstable and contradictory development of the world capitalist economy. Coordinated decisions or concerted effort generally necessitate the correction of structural crises of all types, a struggle against inflation and unemployment on the global level and the neutralization of their dangerous sociopolitical effects on capital.

Furthermore, the need to coordinate the economic policies of imperialist countries stems from the tendency, which became stronger in the 1970's, toward the synchronization of the world capitalist reproductive process, which made crises of a structural and cyclical nature particularly severe and pervasive. For the first time in three and a half decades, the crisis of the mid-1970's and the subsequent crisis of the early 1980's developed in an almost synchronized manner, striking all of the main countries and centers in the capitalist world economic system almost simultaneously. This complicated the efforts of some states to move on to the next phase of the cycle at the expense of others.

The asynchronous nature of world cycles in the 1950's and 1960's turned foreign trade into an instrument for the reduction of domestic overproduction and the emergence of national economies from the state of crisis. The tendency toward synchronization caused foreign trade to lose its function as a unique anti-crisis "safety-valve." Furthermore, just as other forms of world economic ties, it became a channel for the international transference of crises, inflation and currency problems. Some Western economists have even outlined a "external Phillips curve," noting that "unemployment can only be exported with the aid of trade through the import of inflation."⁶

All of this has given rise to the need to coordinate the anti-crisis and anticyclical policies of various capitalist states, to adjust their mid-range

economic development programs accordingly and to issue warnings of actions which can and do have an adverse effect on the economies of other countries and the entire world capitalist economy. Under the conditions of interdependence and fierce competition, this influence is generally unavoidable, and it is particularly negative at times of crisis.

Finally, the need for the economic--and, incidentally, political--consolidation of capitalism on the international level is dictated by the fact that no single imperialist power, even one such as the United States, can aspire to world domination under present conditions. Under the conditions of interdependence, American researchers R. Keohane and J. Nye write, the concept of power changes and even the military strength of a state ceases to represent the decisive leverage in world politics.⁷ The days of the "Marshall Plan" and "Truman Doctrine," when the United States dominated the capitalist system unconditionally, will never return. Now it is beyond the capabilities of American imperialism, whose economic strength is being undermined from within and from without, to realize its hegemonist ambitions or to establish undivided dominion even in non-socialist parts of the world. There is a growing contradiction "between the imperious great-power ambitions stemming from the idea of America's global mission and the constantly diminishing U.S. ability to pursue an imperialist policy in world affairs."⁸

Two basic conclusions can be drawn from this. The first is that the now irrefutable impossibility of world domination by any single imperialist power is a serious factor in the continuous exacerbation of international conflicts and the general crisis of capitalism. Whereas England's historic role as world leader was assumed by other forces pretending to be its heirs when the system of English imperialism suffered its decline, American imperialism, which passed its zenith long ago and has been severely affected by the general crisis of capitalism, has no heirs now and never will. This leads to the second conclusion: To attain its aggressive objectives, U.S. imperialism has to seek support from other capitalist states and other "power centers" and to unite all of the main exploitative forces of the present day on the international level.

It is precisely here that we can find the origins of the geopolitical doctrine of the "division of labor," "distribution of functions" or "division of responsibility," which came into being in the United States (before it had fully recovered from the "post-Vietnam syndrome") and became another source of imperialist differences and conflicts. Whereas U.S. ruling circles view this doctrine as a means of consolidating and expanding their present influence in the world with the support and "blessing" of their allies, two other centers of rivalry--Western Europe and Japan, although it is true that they have continued to uphold "Western solidarity"--hope to change the structure of imperialist partnership on this basis, change relations with America in their own favor and secure an international political role commensurate with their perceptibly increased economic strength.

Institutional Structure

Imperialism is now trying to develop a new mechanism and system for the supranational regulation of world economic processes. The previous structures

and institutions representing no more than the embryonic form of this kind of mechanism have been acknowledged to be ineffective. "The international order established after World War II does not correspond to new circumstances and new requirements," declared a report by the Trilateral Commission, made up of prominent figures from the United States, Western Europe and Japan. "Problems in our increasingly complex world are growing at a speed to which human views and behavior and the decisionmaking process have not been adapted. Functioning institutions and existing procedures are incapable of dealing with global problems and changing processes."⁹

What kind of international mechanism of state-monopolist regulation is supposed to replace the old one? It is too early to say that it has already been established. And it certainly was not established immediately after World War II, as some have said. Nevertheless, we can say that the system of regulative bodies is gradually taking shape as a complex mechanism made up of many links and layers on the bilateral and multilateral, regional and international, intergovernmental and private-monopolist bases.¹⁰

It must be borne in mind, however, that on the lowest levels of this hierarchy, on the bilateral and regional levels, coordinated efforts, even when they can be agreed upon, have more of a disuniting than a uniting impact on the world capitalist economy. It is on these levels that attempts are being made to coordinate not the economic policy of the entire capitalist world, but only the policies of rival countries or their regional or more restricted groups. This is why these efforts have a largely negative effect from the standpoint of the objective needs of the entire capitalist system, where some countries or groups of countries compete with others.

Bilateral "summit" and "near-summit" meetings between the leaders of the United States and various West European countries, the United States and Japan, Japan and the capitalist European countries, and the members of the EEC "big ten," particularly France and the FRG, have recently been more frequent. The sides represented at these conferences are concerned just as much about reproductive, technological, commercial, currency, payment and other particularly pertinent problems in the stabilization of the economic situation as about foreign policy and military issues and East-West relations, whether the discussion concerns measures to avert or alleviate the latest crisis of overproduction, the reduction of energy difficulties, the lowering of inflation or the creation of more jobs. When participants in bilateral talks try to solve these pressing economic problems through frequently futile efforts to reach agreements and surmount conflicts, one of their main considerations is the possibility of transferring their own problems to their rivals and developing and implementing effective countermeasures against them.

The multilateral component of the new international system of state-monopolist economic coordination has a two-leveled structure. On the lowest level, the regional one, current economic policy and joint anticyclical, anti-crisis, deflationary and other similar actions are coordinated, forecasts are compiled and programs for socioeconomic development, usually for the next 5 years and sometimes longer, are drawn up. Attempts are made to set priorities in the overall reorganization of the economic structure and foreign economic relations within integrated groups and between these groups and third countries or their associations.

In Western Europe, where the process of regional capitalist integration has gone the furthest, all of this is the prerogative of primarily the three intergovernmental state-monopolist organizations--above all, the EEC, and also the EFTA and Nordic Council, where the level of joint economic regulation is far below the far from perfect Common Market procedure.

The increasing interdependence of all zones and spheres of the world capitalist economy and the globalization and severity of many of the economic problems of the developed part of the capitalist world in general are making efforts on the regional level of coordination inadequate. After all, world economic ties are something like a "drive belt" for the transfer of economic crises, inflation and mass unemployment from one country to another, not only and not so much within the boundaries of separate regional groups as throughout the world capitalist system. Cost and price disparities are also inherent in the world capitalist reproductive process as a whole. In the broad international context, various aspects of national economic growth policy are also interrelated. On the regional level, and especially on the bilateral level, it is impossible to solve such problems common to the entire capitalist system as disparities in balances of payments and trade, the most severe currency problems and fuel and energy difficulties, and it is impossible to stop the wave of old and new forms of protectionism. These are problems common to the entire capitalist world, and if their resolution is even possible, it can only be done on the international level. The chain reaction of negative developments is not confined to a group of a few states. It arises and spreads throughout the capitalist world, encompassing its centers and its periphery. World economic processes make it into a single entity, tying all conflicting relationships in a single gigantic knot. Untying this knot and stopping the chain reaction to the degree within imperialism's capabilities are possible only within the framework of the entire system of capitalist countries. Here we will move to an analysis of processes developing on the second level of the multilateral link of the new mechanism of international economic coordination.

International economic organizations which were founded immediately after World War II--the IMF, IBRD and GATT, in which the leading position was seized by the United States--have grown more active and have expanded their sphere of influence in recent years.

The Keynesian program for the state-monopolist regulation of postwar international economic relations, designed to counteract the revolutionary process, ceased to satisfy many of imperialism's needs, however, when the world balance of political power changed. The appearance of new international organizations--UNCTAD, which took over some of the functions of the GATT, UNIDO and several others, particularly the IAEA and IEA--did not correct the situation. In the opinion of ruling circles in the United States and its main allies, the role of all these institutions in the coordination of economic policy in the interests of TNC's is now limited.

This is not at all due only to their strictly functional designation and special purpose (credit, loans, currency, foreign trade policy, tariff and non-tariff barriers, energy, etc.). The reasons lie much deeper. We will mention two which seem most significant to us.

The first is the serious change in the composition of these organizations over the past four decades. Above all, the number of their members is now four or five times as high. When the IMF and IBRD were created in the second half of the 1940's, they had 29 members each. Now they have already been joined by 146 states. In 1947, 23 states signed the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, but now 111 countries are affiliated with it in one way or another. Their qualitative makeup has also changed. They were once exclusively or primarily the institutions of developed capitalist countries. As more and more new sovereign states appeared on the political map of the world, they gradually took over some of the prerogatives of the founders of these international organizations (for example, almost three-fourths of the GATT's members are now Asian, African and Latin American states). Some socialist countries are also represented in them now.

The second factor reducing the interest of the leaders of imperialist countries in international organizations of this type as an instrument for the coordination of economic policy is the significant evolution they underwent as a result of these changes in composition.

Of course, the "powers that be" have retained the commanding heights in the GATT, IMF and IBRD. The United States and other large capitalist powers are striving to use these institutions to implement their economic policy, retain their control of the economies of developing countries and influence their policies. The minority is still dictating its will to the weaker but much larger majority. Judging by past events, particularly the results of the latest "Tokyo round" of GATT trade negotiations, this is frequently successful: The industrial states usually get their own way by hook or by crook. The West no longer has its earlier free hand, however, and the majority is certainly no longer "silent." It opposes the handful of imperialist states headed by the United States, openly disagrees with the imperialists and initiates discussions of the most important aspects of the program for a new international economic order.¹¹

When the young states act in concert, American and other neocolonizers often have to adhere to the principles of equality and mutual benefit. In any case, the countries making up the three centers of imperialism are "diluted," so to speak, in some international economic organizations, and the latter are no longer an obedient instrument of the capitalist world's upper echelon. When 108 states voted in favor of a resolution condemning the American aggression in Grenada in the UN General Assembly in early November 1983, Ronald Reagan admitted that 100 UN countries disagree with America on almost every item on the agenda involving the United States.

In connection with this, there is a clear tendency in the policy of Washington and some of its allies to reduce the number of states participating in making certain decisions in the area of capitalist economic regulation or, more precisely, in the planning of joint economic strategy. An attempt was made to enhance the role of the OECD, which consists only of developed countries and some middle-income capitalist states, which might be inclined, within the confines of their "family circle," with no "outsiders" present, and in a relatively less stressful environment, to outline a more acceptable economic

strategy for themselves, particularly in interrelations with socialist and newly liberated states.

Two programs of economic growth, for 1960-1971 and for 1972-1980, were drawn up in just over two decades in the OECD. Several forecasts were compiled, including long-range ones (for 20-25 years). Numerous recommendations were issued for the regulation of international trade, the removal of commercial barriers, the stabilization of currency, payment and credit relations and the struggle against inflation and unemployment, as well as recommendations on energy policy, environmental protection, demography and so forth. Many proposals were never implemented, however, and primarily as a result of disagreements between OECD members. Therefore, even this association of countries turned out not to be close enough, and the membership turned out to be too broad. In addition to performing other functions, the OECD is a research information center with consultative functions, and although it makes some decisions, they are not binding for anyone.

"The Big Seven": Economic Nationalism on the Rise

In this atmosphere the ruling elite in the United States and the other main Western countries needed new ways of coordinating economic policy, as well as domestic, foreign and military policy, with the aid of which it could reach agreements behind the backs of even the majority of developed capitalist states. This kind of opportunity was provided by the annual secret meetings, organized within the framework of an international organization, of the top leaders of the "big seven," or the "big six" (Canada was not represented in the first meeting in Rambouillet in 1975), or less frequently the "big four" (Italy, Japan and Canada were not represented at the special Guadeloupe meeting in January 1979).

Almost three-fourths of the states belonging to the OECD, including all of the small EEC countries (Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, Denmark, Ireland and Greece), were left out of these meetings. The underprivileged "six" from the Common Market, which (with the exception of Ireland) also belong to NATO, have expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that they are constantly asked to contribute more to aggressive Western military preparations but are left out of the planning of imperialist strategy and are not asked about decisions on economic, political and military matters. The inclusion of the president of the Commission of the European Communities in these conferences with observer status did not change the situation.

The "big seven" have now met 10 times. The series of meetings began when the capitalist world was emerging from a most severe economic crisis, and the latest meeting was held in a similar situation, following another, even more destructive crisis. Market conditions during this interval, almost half of which was taken up by crisis years, left a strong impression on the talks. Each conference was held at a time of either an economic or an energy or a monetary crisis, and always at a time of inflation and unemployment. Participants could do nothing other than focus their attention on this group of problems and change the "main enemies" of stability according to the fluctuations of the economic pendulum, always having to choose between deflationary

and inflationary means of regulation. Consequently, the negotiations invariably revolved around the same "damned problems" in the capitalist economy, which were also analyzed at bilateral, regional and other conferences of this type. In spite of what could be called a comprehensive approach to them, however, radical joint solutions were almost never discovered. The pitiful results of capitalist economic development over the past decade are the best proof of this.

This low level of productivity is largely due to the fact that economic developments and dynamics in each of the "big seven" countries did not always coincide, even with the tendency toward the synchronization of the world capitalist cycle and even within the framework of a single cyclical phase. In 1980, for example, the real GNP of the United States and England decreased, whereas it increased in Canada, the FRG, France and especially Italy and Japan. The next year production volume in the United States, Canada, Japan, the FRG and France increased, but it decreased in Italy and England. In 1982 it decreased in the United States, the FRG and Italy, but increased in the rest of the "big seven" states. By the time of the Williamsburg meeting in spring 1983, the decline of production had stopped in all of these countries, with the exception of Italy.

Is it at all surprising that each state chooses an economic line with a view to objective conditions, its own interests and its specific aims and pursues a commercial policy distinct from the policy of its partners? After all, different illnesses cannot be cured with the same medicine. WASHINGTON POST correspondent J. Kraft was correct when he wrote that economic policy has turned out to be the "most serious stumbling-block in relations between Europe and America"¹² (and Japan, we might add).

The differing aims of the economic policy of individual countries signified the inevitability of the failure of the strategy and tactics of the "big seven" from the very beginning. Several times, its members solemnly declared that they were acknowledging their interdependence by reaffirming their common goals and the need to consider the effects of their political actions on their partners. But these were always just words, having nothing in common with the actual line of unconcealed nationalism in the sphere of economic policy and diplomacy.

The roots of what is called the "third crisis" (after the two oil crises), which was most severe in Western Europe, can be found in the reluctance and, strictly speaking, the inability of each member of the "big seven" to consider the frequently conflicting interests and needs of its partners. The lengthy crisis, which is still going on, is the one in which the colossal federal budget deficit in the United States, its rigid credit terms and the artificial rise in the exchange rate of the dollar had a pernicious effect on the economy of Western Europe. The anti-inflationary policy of the Reagan Administration, which was overtly predatory, ruined the conditions of the investment process in West European countries by causing the overseas transfer of huge amounts of capital. It complicated their efforts to solve the problems of employment and unemployment. At first it intensified the economic crisis and then it began to inhibit the development of subsequent phases of the cycle. There was a

new wave of inflation because Western Europe had to pay more for imported oil, some raw materials and other products paid for in dollars.

The reality of capitalism corroborates the accuracy of statements by researchers who believe that cooperation by the "big seven" cannot be effective in principle. For example, American economist F. Bergsten says that the inability of the governments of the United States and other Western countries to solve the main problems in the world economy led to the almost total collapse of the postwar system of capitalist international economic relations, which rested on three pillars--the currency system based on the dollar and fixed exchange rates, a foreign trade system with an emphasis on custom tariffs and the network of agreements on foreign assistance. After this, in his opinion, the capitalist world had three possible options with regard to international economic regulation. The first was hegemony by a single country with enough strength to play this role; but "this option is not viable...because there is no real contender for the role." The second was "non-intervention," meaning that the government would not regulate currency exchange rates, foreign trade or overseas investments; Bergsten also considered this option to be unpromising in view of the great variety of national economic and social objectives. The third option remained: "joint regulation by a few countries, particularly those with the greatest strength in the world economic system." Even this kind of regulation, he feels, "is extremely difficult under the conditions of extremely divergent goals."¹³

It is understandable that the focus of battles at the "summit" conferences gradually shifted from the regulation of international economic relations to the coordination of the domestic economic policies of the seven countries. Regardless of the format of their final communiques, almost all of them bear the imprint of mutual concessions and temporary compromises, and often, of course, in favor of the strongest. But their terse and sometimes mutually exclusive provisions invariably reflect the differing economic and political positions and irreconcilable differences of the "high-level negotiators."

All of this proves that Washington, which can usually rely on the benevolent support of England, not only tried to impose its own unrealistic views on other participants, but was also subjected to equally strong pressure itself (in matters pertaining to interest rates, for example, at all recent meetings) by Bonn and Paris, and to some extent by Rome and Ottawa, which had no wish to surrender in the face of the American-English "entente cordiale." The comparative "neutrality" of Tokyo, on the other hand, was generally paid for with complete but eloquent silence about Japan's export inroads into the American, West European and other markets.

The Ottawa communique of 1981 illustrates how meaningless and vague many of the decisions of the "big seven" can be. The conference was held at a time when the economic crisis was far from over and there was still no "light at the end of the tunnel." Conference recommendations simply said that the related problems of inflation and unemployment should be solved simultaneously; the issuance of government loans should be reduced immediately in the majority of countries and the growth of budget deficits should be deterred by the limitation of government spending; capital investments and innovations in

production should be given stronger support; the stability of the international capitalist banking system and international financial institutions should be secured; and finally, the protection of the environment and our planet's resources should be a consideration in the planning of long-range economic policy. And this was all. The declaration did not and could not say how all of this should be accomplished. At other conferences, there were often disagreements over the sacrosanct matter of the optimal rate of economic growth for the absorption of "excessive" unemployment and the simultaneous avoidance of a new wave of galloping inflation. But even these discussions were unproductive in most cases.

As for world economic problems which had been relegated to a secondary position but were still on the agenda, the heads of state and government also confined themselves either to the simple ascertainment of the state of affairs in these areas or to totally unbinding good intentions, such as the expediency of stabilizing currency and financial markets, resisting protectionist pressure, sustaining efforts to liberalize international trade and to establish an "open" multilateral trade system, etc. These goals were unashamedly declared by the heads of states engaged in the constant erection of newer and higher protectionist barriers on their borders.

In the case of one problem, however, the "big seven" took a realistic approach and accomplished something. This was the energy crisis. It was a topic of earnest discussion for 4 years in a row (1977-1980)--at the conferences in London, Bonn, Tokyo and Venice. Projected reductions in the consumption, imports and proportions of oil in the fuel and energy supply of these countries, the dimensions of strategic oil reserves and the scales on which coal mining would be increased and alternative energy resources would be used were stipulated in exact quantitative terms. But the correction of the energy situation owes as much to the economic crisis of the early 1980's as to the "summit" meetings. Attempts were also made at these four conferences to clarify some of the other obligations of participants, define their parameters and schedule the attainment of objectives. The decisions of the next four meetings, however, did not contain even a hint of this clarification.

The conferences of the top political leaders of the United States and the other main capitalist countries have turned into an arena of fierce conflicts, reflecting all the depth of their divergence, which remains even when some kind of temporary agreement can be reached. By submerging the causes of inter-imperialist conflicts instead of eradicating them, these compromises make new and frequently even more acute conflicts inevitable.

There are many examples of this. For instance, immediately after the Versailles meeting (1982), the United States started an undeclared "steel war" with the West European states and, without any kind of advance warning, imposed sanctions on the companies of these countries for participating in the erection of the transcontinental gasline from Siberia to Western Europe, and France devaluated its currency in its own interest. Besides this, as soon as the conference in Williamsburg (1983) was over, the United States raised interest rates again. Therefore, each conference was followed by a "new test of strength between the United States and its recession-ridden allies."¹⁴

We could say without any exaggeration that the meetings of the "big seven" have been confined to general verbal declarations and have solved almost none of the major economic problems the main capitalist countries have encountered and are still encountering. They did not attain their stated objectives: a coordinated approach to general difficulties and the joint planning of a far-reaching economic strategy. And this is understandable because these conferences are an arena of struggle for the enhancement of the prestige of each participant, and the discussions there actually concern the redistribution of spheres of influence "according to strength" or "according to capital," which obviously cannot easily be negotiated without battles.

Nevertheless, these regular meetings represent a definite step toward the unification of the separate imperialist states attempting to counteract progressive social changes in the world. From the very beginning, these conferences have been convened, strictly speaking, primarily to demonstrate "Western solidarity" at a time when the world balance of power is displaying more and more irretrievable losses for imperialism.

The conferences of the "big seven" have grown more political each time. This "politicization" began to take on maximum proportions at the Venice meeting--that is, at the time when aggressive imperialist forces led by the United States resumed their unrestrained escalation of international tension. Assessing the 1984 London conference in his responses to PRAVDA's questions, K. U. Chernenko stressed: "The latest meeting of the 'big seven' was convened ostensibly for the discussion of economic problems. The primary issue, however, was political...." Conference participants gave their seal of approval to objectives contrary to the interests of detente, disarmament and peace."¹⁵

In this way, the economic conferences of the captains of the capitalist world, conceived of as a means of correcting inter-imperialist conflicts, have taken on clear political overtones and have become a special mechanism for the elaboration of the West's global anti-Soviet, antisocialist, counterrevolutionary strategy. Soliciting active support from its allies for its own imperious hegemonist line, American imperialism is simultaneously striving to divert their attention more and more from urgent economic problems.

The Ottawa "Political Statement" and "Statement on International Terrorism," the Williamsburg statement on military policy and the London declarations on "Democratic Values" and, once again, on "International Terrorism" reflected the common ideology and common views of participants on important foreign policy issues. They reinforced the assumption that the international politico-military alliance of imperialists is directed against the revolutionary forces of the present day, especially the USSR and the entire socialist community.

We can say with certainty that the attempts of American and world imperialism to lay a state-monopolist foundation for some kind of supervising transnational center and mechanism for the negotiation and coordination of strategy in the economic, political and other spheres and for the eradication of new and growing differences have been quite ineffective. This is the unavoidable result of the sweeping and powerful centrifugal forces accompanying the

centripetal tendency in the system of imperialist states. Inter-imperialist contradictions and conflicts--traditional and new, economic, political and even military--are still among the most important immutable natural laws of contemporary capitalist development. As a result, state-monopolist economic regulation is experiencing a severe crisis not only in the United States and other capitalist countries, but also, without having enough time for thorough development, on the international level, throughout the world capitalist system.

FOOTNOTES

1. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 36, p 332.
2. Ibid., vol 37, p 10.
3. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 23, p 501.
4. V. I. Lenin, Op. cit., vol 27, p 322.
5. K. Marx and F. Engels, Op. cit., vol 25, pt I, pp 481-482.
6. "Economic Foreign Policies of Industrial States," edited by W. Kohl, Lexington (Mass.)--Toronto, 1977, p 16.
7. R. Keohane and J. Nye, "Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition," Boston--Toronto, 1977.
8. "Sovremennaya vneshnaya politika SShA" [Contemporary U.S. Foreign Policy], vol 1, Moscow, 1984, p 4.
9. "Towards a Renovated International System. Triangle Papers: 14," Trilateral Commission, N.Y., 1977, p 1.
10. The private monopolist bases of international state economic regulation, the dual role of TNC's in this process and the role played by "shadow cabinets"--informal bodies of the oligarchic elite, such as the Bilderburg Club and the Trilateral Commission--are not discussed in this article.
11. For more detail, see N. P. Shmelev, "For a New International Economic Order: Dreams and Realities," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1984, No 10--Editor's note.
12. THE WASHINGTON POST, 13 July 1981.
13. "Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States," edited by P. Katzenstein, Madison, 1978, pp 1, 10.
14. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 27 July 1981, p 25.
15. KOMMUNIST, 1984, No 9, p 15.

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GROWING JAPANESE MILITARY ROLE IN ALLIANCE WITH U.S.

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 85 (signed to press 15 Feb 85) pp 40-49

[Article by M. G. Nosov: "United States and Japan: Present Stage of Politico-Military Relations"]

[Text] The results of 4 years of Reagan Administration policy toward Japan suggest serious changes in the American approach to Japan's place in U.S. global strategy and to the development of bilateral ties. The many statements by high-level Washington spokesmen to the effect that Japan is "the United States' main ally in Asia," reminiscent of remarks by members of previous administrations, are not simply standard political rhetoric today, but a reality reflected in increasingly close military cooperation.

As soon as Ronald Reagan entered the White House, the United States began to pay closer attention to the Asian Pacific, regarding it as one of the most important arenas of confrontation with the USSR, which acquired special importance in view of the increasingly heated disagreements with Western Europe over the main issue of contemporary politics--international detente. As U.S NEWS AND WORLD REPORT frankly said at that time, the essence of Reagan's policy in Asia would be colored by the "desire to create an anti-Soviet coalition within the framework of a doctrine designed to revive American leadership in Asia."¹ (This U.S. desire to win the status of an "Asian power" was also dictated by purely economic considerations. American trade with the countries of the Asian Pacific exceeded the volume of trade with America's traditional partner, Western Europe, for the first time in 1981, and by 1983 the difference had already reached 26 billion dollars. Over the last 5 years there has been a 65-percent increase in direct U.S. investments in the economies of the countries of this region.)²

Washington is now more inclined to view Japan as an ally capable of taking on some of the military functions that were previously the exclusive prerogative of the United States.

The changes in American policy toward Japan have affected primarily the nature and scales of military cooperation by the two countries. The Reagan Administration has concentrated on two features in its efforts to strengthen the American-Japanese military alliance: First of all, the clarification of

Japan's military role in American global strategy and, secondly, the eradication of virtually all existing constitutional and moral limitations on Japan's militarization.

The question of clarifying Japan's military functions, coordinated with the actions of U.S. armed forces by the terms of the "security treaty," was actually first considered in 1978, when the American-Japanese consultative committee created 3 years before published a memorandum on "Cooperation in the Sphere of Defense," which defined the functions of American and Japanese armed forces in the event of an "emergency." The latter were assigned "a defensive role on the territory of Japan and the surrounding seas and air space." The United States assumed the responsibility of "supporting the operations of Japanese self-defense forces and conducting operations on scales exceeding the capabilities of these forces." The memorandum also said that the armed forces of the United States and Japan would be under national command and would not constitute a combined military system, as in the case of NATO, and envisaged "occasional consultations between the Japanese and U.S. governments with regard to the situation in the Far East."³

The Reagan Administration's 4 years in the White House have proved that Washington is no longer satisfied just with an increase in Japanese military spending (these expenditures have been rising constantly since the middle of the 1970's: by 13.9 percent in 1976, 11.8 percent in 1977, 12.4 percent in 1978, 10.2 percent in 1979 and so forth) and has transferred to a policy of coordinated military efforts and the assignment of specific military functions to Japan.

The American pressure on Japan has been rationalized with the main thesis of Reagan's propaganda about the need for the Western countries to unite in response to the so-called "Soviet threat," and has been justified specifically for Japan by the "buildup of Soviet armed forces in the Far East." Under Washington's pressure, Japan has committed itself to the dramatic quantitative and qualitative buildup of military potential, needed primarily to secure such objectives as the patrol of sea lanes 1,000 miles (1,800 kilometers) from the Japanese coastline, the blockage of international straits in the Sea of Japan, and several others.

The patrolling of the 1,000-mile zone, which has become one of the main elements of U.S.-Japanese military relations, was first put on the agenda at the beginning of the 1970's: In June 1973 the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) responded to pressure from Washington by publishing a statement recording "the functions of guarding shipping in a radius of 1,000 nautical miles from the Japanese coastline."⁴ For a long time, this statement was regarded as a fairly abstract promise, as it was obvious that Japan was not actually capable of performing these functions yet.

The Reagan Administration quite skillfully made use of this circumstance to involve Japan more deeply in the process of militarization. Scolding Tokyo for its inability to keep its promises, the Pentagon insisted on the development of sufficient Japanese military potential for the performance of these duties. The focus of American press was transferred from demands for higher

military spending to the buildup of military strength. It is obvious that Japan's participation in specific patrol undertakings was not Washington's primary or only goal at this stage, since, according to American estimates, Japan will not be able to attain these objectives until the beginning of the 1990's. Within the context of this process, however, opportunities arose for the reinforcement of the entire system of American-Japanese military cooperation and the involvement of Japan in U.S. global strategy. This was precisely the purpose of the American demands for Japan's participation in military operations outside its territorial waters.

During the first meeting between President Reagan and Japanese Prime Minister Z. Suzuki in May 1981 in Washington, the United States was already proposing the reorganization of the relations between the two countries on the basis of stronger military cooperation. Japan, which had always refused to join military alliances prior to this, signed a joint communique in which American-Japanese relations were defined as an "alliance" for the first time in the postwar history of these relations. And although the Japanese prime minister assured an interviewer that this was not a military alliance, the communique was criticized so severely in Japan that Foreign Minister M. Ito, who had taken full responsibility for this decision, had to resign.

The groundlessness of the allegations that these were not references to a "military alliance" is corroborated by the inclusion of a statement in the document about "the appropriate division of roles between Japan and the United States to secure peace and stability in the region," and by the inclusion of Suzuki's announcement that Japan, "on its own initiative and in accordance with its constitution," would make an earnest effort to "heighten its capability to defend the territory of Japan and the surrounding seas and air space." Specifying what he meant by the words "heighten its capability to defend," the inclusion of which in this communique was called the "main purpose of the summit meeting" by ASAHI SHIMBUN,⁵ Z. Suzuki made the following remark at a press conference in Washington: "We want to strengthen our capabilities for the defense of the several hundred miles of sea around Japan and the 1,000-mile shipping zone beyond our coastline, with consideration for, and in line with, our constitution."⁶

The attempts to portray the decision to patrol the 1,000-mile zone as Japan's own idea turned out to be absolutely futile: In January 1982, during sessions of the American-Japanese Consultative Committee on Security Issues, the United States announced that the "Japanese patrol of the 1,000-mile zone in the Pacific Ocean is part of the American global strategy directed against USSR policy in the Far East, and Japan's ability to defend this region is a matter of importance to the entire free world."⁷ American Congressman P. Findley went even further in his assessment of Japan's role in U.S. strategy by stating in March 1982 that "the 1,000-mile zone is only an intermediate objective for Japan," and that in the future it, in his opinion, should "guard sea lanes all the way to the Persian Gulf."⁸

Almost a year after Z. Suzuki's visit to Washington, U.S. Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger went to Tokyo and demanded that Japan keep the promise the prime minister had made in Washington. Although the Japanese prime

minister categorically denied that he had taken on any obligations concerning the defense of shipping when he was in Washington, his attempts to prove the absence of any agreements on this matter were less indicative of the truth than of the hope of gradually preparing the Japanese public to accept changes in the military relations between the two countries. As THE JAPAN TIMES reported, "both the news and the denial served specific informational goals. The public is clearly aware of what the prime minister actually had in mind, despite his 'official' denial."⁹

When Y. Nakasone became prime minister of Japan in November 1982, American-Japanese military cooperation became much more active. During his visit to Washington in January 1983, he was already speaking frankly about the existence of an American-Japanese military alliance and confirming Japan's willingness to participate in the patrolling of sea lanes and in the blockade of international straits in the Sea of Japan. He frankly admitted the subject of lengthy negotiations by representatives of the military establishments of the two countries. In 1980 the Pentagon had reported that "Japan and the United States are negotiating the blockade of straits in the event of a state of emergency."¹⁰ One of the results of this policy was Japan's decision to begin patrolling the Korea, Sangar and La Perouse straits in May 1983.¹¹

In its attempts to involve Japan so extensively in its own military-strategic plans, Washington has considerably relaxed the emphasis on direct demands for larger Japanese military expenditures. People in the White House now realize that this kind of pressure is viewed in Japan as American intervention in domestic politics and leads to serious public opposition to American requests in Japan. This certainly does not mean that the United States stopped insisting on higher Japanese military spending, but it made considerable changes in its methods of attaining this goal. Now Washington is trying to create the impression that the prerogative of determining the amounts of military spending is Japan's own, and that the United States is merely showing an interest in the results.

In reality, however, Tokyo is growing more dependent on American diktat in the sphere of military relations. Evidence of this can be found in the 1983 program for the development of Japanese armed forces during the 1983-1987 period, envisaging the substantial buildup of arms in precisely the areas to which Washington has assigned priority. In June 1981 the U.S. Government submitted a plan to Tokyo, stating that the Japanese armed forces should have 70 destroyers, 25 submarines, 125 P-3C Orion antisubmarine aircraft and several hundred F-15 fighter planes to secure the blockage of straits and the protection of sea lanes.¹² Although Japan refused to satisfy all of Washington's demands, its own program envisages the augmentation of the number of destroyers from 49 in 1983 to 60 in 1987, of P-3C planes from 6 to 72, of F-15 fighters from 20 to 138, etc.¹³ The cost of this program will total 17-18 billion dollars,¹⁴ and most of the military equipment will be produced by Japanese industry, which, according to some Western experts, is already¹⁵ providing the Self-Defense Forces with around 95 percent of all their weapons.

For example, 11 of the 36 types of planes purchased by the JDA were developed in Japan, 16 are produced in Japan on American licenses and only 9 are imported from the United States; 4 of the 13 types of missiles are fully

Japanese in origin, 6 are produced on American licenses and only 3 are imported.¹⁶

Of course, this program required a significant increase in military spending, which rose from 9.9 billion dollars to 12.5 billion in fiscal years 1981-1984. According to official Japanese estimates, this represented 0.99 percent of the GNP in 1984. However, if Japanese military expenditures are calculated according to the NATO procedure, they actually total, according to Japanese military expert M. Nishihara, from 17.6 billion dollars to 19.8 billion, or 1.6 percent of the GNP.¹⁷ In addition, Japan is spending over a billion dollars a year on the maintenance of American military bases on its territory, covering around one-third of the cost of the American military presence.

American demands for the buildup of Japanese military potential have led to a situation in which arms purchases constitute automatic prerequisites for a future rise in military spending. In 1983, for example, the expenditures envisaged for the F-15 planes purchased that year were equivalent only to 0.2 percent of their cost, and the remaining 99.8 percent had to be carried over to subsequent budgets. At present, deferred payments represent around 30 percent of the military budget.¹⁸ In this way, the Japanese Government can take on increasingly extensive military commitments while creating the illusion in Japan that military spending is still not too high. Soon, however, taxpayers will have to honor all of these obligations.

Japan also has a significant part to play in U.S. global strategy, which includes the assistance of the countries Washington wants to support. Japan is assisting Pakistan, Egypt and Turkey; it has assumed 70 percent of the cost of cleaning and enlarging the Suez Canal, which gives American aircraft carriers unimpeded access to the Indian Ocean from the Mediterranean Sea. It was no coincidence that G. Shultz announced on 2 September 1983 in Shimoda that "Japan's present role in the Persian Gulf is much more important than it might seem."¹⁹ Tokyo is still providing antigovernment forces in Afghanistan with material support and has given Afghan counterrevolutionaries 62 million dollars since 1979.

Viewing Japan as a military base close to the Soviet coastline, the Reagan Administration exerted stronger pressure for the purpose of effectively eradicating the three non-nuclear principles of Japan's 1966 commitment "not to possess nuclear weapons, produce them or allow their emplacement on its territory." The question of whether or not American nuclear weapons have been emplaced in Japan in the past is still being debated in the Japanese press, although there is sound evidence that the United States did bring nuclear weapons into Japan with the consent of the Japanese Government. For example, according to data published in the United States in 1984, 129 American warships carrying nuclear weapons are deployed in the Pacific Ocean, including 31 submarines, all 6 of the aircraft carriers of the U.S. 7th and 3d fleets, the battleship "New Jersey," 17 cruisers, 30 destroyers and 44 frigates. There are planes carrying nuclear weapons on American airfields in Japan: the A-7 Corsair (Atsugi), the F-15 Eagle (Kadena) and the P-3C Orion (Misawa); M-109, M-198 and M-110 artillery guns using nuclear charges are deployed on Okinawa.²⁰ It is difficult to believe that all of these

carriers, which represent part of U.S. nuclear strength, have not been provided with the necessary quantities of nuclear weapons, and that the aircraft carrier "Midway" and around 10 other ships, including missile cruisers, based in Yokosuka Port and the nuclear submarines periodically entering Sasebo Port leave their nuclear weapons outside Japan's territorial waters.

In September 1982 representatives of the military agencies of the two countries reached an agreement on the deployment of two squadrons of the latest American F-16 fighter-bombers, capable of delivering nuclear weapons for distances exceeding 1,000 kilometers, on Japan's Misawa Air Force Base (northern Honshu) in 1985. Neither in Washington nor in Tokyo are they keeping it a secret that these planes are intended primarily for offensive operations against the Soviet Far East. The American Kadena Base on Okinawa is used for the inspection and maintenance of the planes of U.S. strategic aviation--B-52 bombers equipped with cruise missiles, C-141 cargo planes intended for the delivery of containers with nuclear warheads, and the KC-135 tanker planes. Centers for communications with strategic bomber aviation are located on Kadena and Yokota bases, and a center for communications with submarines equipped with ballistic missiles is located on the naval base in Yosami.²¹ Round-the-clock patrols for the electronic surveillance of Soviet territory are conducted by 15 SR-71 and RC-135 planes from American bases in Japan. Two American nuclear submarines are permanently located in the Sea of Okhotsk.²²

In summer 1984 the United States began the deployment of Tomahawk cruise missiles with nuclear warheads with a range of over 2,500 kilometers on the ships of the 7th Fleet. This was the first stage in an extensive program for the nuclear rearming of the American Navy. Plans call for the deployment of Standard-2 missiles with nuclear warheads in 1987 and a new type of anti-submarine missile with a nuclear charge, the Standoff, in 1988, and a decision has been made to equip the Phoenix and Harpoon missiles, torpedoes and naval artillery with nuclear warheads.²³ All of these weapons will not only lead to the dramatic destabilization of the situation in the Asian Pacific, but will also make the control of the nuclear weapons on the ships of the U.S. 7th Fleet impossible.

Prime Minister Nakasone seems to have made Japan part of the 7th Fleet as an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" and has displayed greater willingness than his predecessors to cooperate with the United States in nuclear matters. In May 1984 he admitted that the Japanese fleet could take part in combat operations in conjunction with U.S. naval ships equipped with nuclear cruise missiles in a state of emergency, and he said that this would not "be contrary to the three non-nuclear principles."²³

In today's Japan, ideas of this kind are hardly likely to win public support: The attempts to turn Japan into the Pentagon's nuclear bridgehead have evoked a strong wave of public protest. This, however, has only led to louder appeals from the advocates of the buildup of Japanese nuclear potential. One of these is Tsukuba University lecturer Y. Nakagawa. In an article in SHINBOEIRONSHU, he proposed the creation of Japanese nuclear "deterrence" forces, aimed at Soviet cities, and suggested that Trident submarines and 10 MX missiles could be purchased from the United States for this purpose.²⁵

Ruling circles in Washington and Tokyo are now inclined to view Japan in the context of the overall military plans of NATO countries, and this was announced by U.S. Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger in his regular report to the Congress in 1983: "American forward-based forces and the armed forces of our allies are securing the line of conventional defense in Western Europe, Japan and Korea, which represents the basis of our system of collective security."²⁶ At a session of the American-Japanese Consultative Committee on Security Issues in June 1984, American representatives made the first official statement about the "interaction and interchangeability" of the armed forces of the two countries, which presupposes the standardization of weapons, communications and control systems and actually signifies the complete subordination of the Self-Defense Forces to American command--that is, it cancels out the 1978 principles declaring Japan's reservation of the right to manage its own military operations.

Washington's approach to Japan as the "Far Eastern flank of NATO" coincides completely with the globalist tendencies in the policy of Japanese ruling circles, and especially with the ambitions of Y. Nakasone, who announced at the summit meeting in Williamsburg that he "would like Japan to have a colossal impact on international politics and assume responsibility as a member of the free world." He views the attainment of this goal primarily in Japan's assumption of new military responsibilities. As the CHICAGO TRIBUNE remarked, "many Europeans believe that in Williamsburg Nakasone looked much more like a NATO leader than the NATO leaders."²⁷ Tokyo views on Japan's participation in the bloc are indicated by the proposal on "unofficial consultations" between Japan and the NATO countries, which was put forth by Foreign Minister S. Abe with U.S. support during his trip to Western Europe in 1983.²⁸

The United States is also giving serious consideration to the establishment of a Washington-Tokyo-Seoul military-political axis. Hoping to transfer some operational functions in the western Pacific to the Japanese and South Korean armed forces, the Pentagon plans to make part of its own forces available for reinforcements in other areas. For this purpose, the United States is encouraging Japanese-South Korean military cooperation and is trying to convince Japan of the three countries' common interests in the sphere of security. The Pentagon views joint efforts by Japan and South Korea to block Far Eastern straits as one aspect of this cooperation. This was discussed in December 1983, when Admiral J. Watkins, U.S. chief of naval operations, met with K. Tanikawa, then the head of the JDA.²⁹

Japanese military formations have actually already taken part in American-South Korean combat maneuvers. In 1982 the American-Japanese Yamasakura-1 exercises, in which around 1,000 Japanese officers took part, were held at the same time as the annual American-South Korean "Team Spirit" maneuvers. Japan and South Korea have concluded several agreements on the development of military cooperation, envisaging the mutual observation of combat maneuvers and the exchange of military delegations and information. In April 1984, Japanese aviation conducted joint exercises with U.S. Air Force units deployed in South Korea, which represented another step toward a tripartite military alliance.

Under direct pressure from Washington, the Nakasone government offered Seoul 4 billion dollars in loans and credit on preferential terms in January 1983. This was done literally the day before the Japanese prime minister's trip to Washington and was viewed by the Japanese press as a concession to the United States prior to the difficult negotiation of economic issues by the two countries. The U.S. demands for the extension of credit to South Korea were connected not only with a desire to strengthen the Seoul regime's economic and military potential at Japan's expense, but also the hope of establishing the necessary conditions to surmount the traditional political friction between Tokyo and Seoul, which, according to the plans of Washington strategists, would strengthen their military and political cooperation over the long range.

Washington also put considerable effort in eliminating the restrictions on Japan's remilitarization in the area of exports of Japanese military technology to the United States. When the United States asked for Tokyo's permission to import Japanese military technology in June 1980, the government refused this request, citing the "three principles of the renunciation of weapon exports" adopted by the ruling party in 1967. In January 1983, however, after lengthy debates the Nakasone cabinet gave in to American pressure and decided to export Japanese military technology to the United States because this, as the government announcement said, "is extremely important for the defense agreements between Japan and the United States" and will "help to strengthen confidence in the American-Japanese alliance."³⁰

What motivated Washington to demand that Japan export its military technology, and Japan to agree to these demands?

Japan's decision was apparently dictated by several factors. By agreeing to export military technology to the United States, the Japanese Government demonstrated its willingness to give in to Washington's pressure in matters of militarization in exchange for some U.S. restraint in the economic sphere. At the same time, for the Nakasone government the cancellation of the ban on exports of military technology was a step toward the further development of the military industry and a chance to make the necessary preparations for the export of weapons, which has long been a prominent goal of representatives of the Japanese business community. For example, Vice President M. Okuma of the Nissan company said: "The next sphere on which we will focus our attention to secure economic growth is defense and the aerospace industry."³¹ According to the estimates of Japanese economists, the removal of arms export barriers would give Japan an opportunity to control around 60 percent of warship production, 40 percent of the military electronics market, 46 percent of the production of military transport vehicles and from 25 to 30 percent of aerospace production on the international level within the near future.³²

As for Washington, its decision was primarily of a political nature. Despite the Pentagon's definite interest in including Japan's present military-industrial potential in American military efforts, it must be borne in mind that the United States is still spending approximately 170-190 times as much as Japan on military research and development.³³ Furthermore, the United States has always been able to import any Japanese technological innovations through conventional commercial channels. This applies to Japanese

achievements in such spheres as the development high-speed integral computer circuits, superconductive optical fibers, laser technology and several others where the latest technological processes can be used for civilian and military purposes. It is obvious that the United States is primarily striving to force Japan to cancel all restrictions in the sphere of arms production and exports.

The agreement on exports of Japanese military technology to the United States will also serve the purpose of establishing control over the Japanese military industry. The Reagan Administration is urging the rearming of Japan, viewing the development of military industry not only as a material foundation for the reinforcement of Japanese potential but also as a means of destroying the constitutional barriers inhibiting this process. American calculations also include, however, the fear that the development of this industry could have unpredictable economic and political implications. Washington wants to make Japan solidly dependent on the American arms market by means of direct purchases, licensed production and technical cooperation in the production of specific types of weapons. This allows the United States to retain some control over the development of Japanese military production, although it also creates important prerequisites for the continued growth of this industry.

Assigning priority to the development of military relations with Japan, the Reagan Administration made some changes in its approach to commercial and economic relations between the two countries. The U.S. deficit in trade with Japan, which displayed a tendency toward reduction in 1979 and 1980, rose from 10 billion dollars to almost 20 billion between 1980 and 1983,³⁴ and reached 35 billion in 1984.³⁵ The White House is seriously disturbed by the growth of this deficit, but whereas previous administrations regarded this as the most important problem in relations with Tokyo, the Republican administration has placed less emphasis on the liberalization of the Japanese market and the reduction of exports to the United States in exchange for Japan's willingness to accept American demands in military matters. Without giving up the use of various types of sanctions and other forms of pressure, or sometimes just the threat to use them, to reduce the U.S. deficit in trade with Japan,³⁶ Washington has linked this problem closely with questions connected with the remilitarization of Japan. It is indicative that when Reagan and Nakasone met in January 1984, the Japanese prime minister felt the need to announce his support of U.S. policy in international affairs, including the U.S. position on arms control and Reagan's "Star Wars" plan.³⁷

The acceptance of the American policy of slightly weaker protectionism by Japanese ruling circles in exchange for Japan's involvement in U.S. politico-military strategy is causing Japanese policy to become more and more dependent on the U.S. line.

The process of Japan's involvement in U.S. global military strategy is aimed at turning it into a strong military power with future functions that might transcend the bounds of the Far Eastern region. At the same time, people in Washington hope to retain absolute politico-military control over Japan, which is viewed in the United States, in the words of ASIAN PERSPECTIVE,

"not as an ally, but as a military protectorate."³⁸ Americans hope to deprive Tokyo of the right to make independent political decisions. Whereas in the 1970's Japan made some effort to elaborate its own diplomatic line, which did not always coincide in all respects with Washington's dictates, Tokyo's foreign policy returned to the American orbit after Ronald Reagan took office in the United States and Y. Nakasone took office in Japan.

Despite all of the talk about an "equal partnership," people in Washington still view Japan as a country directly dependent on American policy. With unconcealed cynicism, American researchers W. Carpenter and S. Gibert commented in an article in COMPARATIVE STRATEGY magazine: "If one group of leaders cannot satisfy the Americans, another group will be found.... It is the aim of the Reagan Administration and the U.S. Congress to create the kind of atmosphere in which the Japanese who object to the reasonable division of the defense burden will always be aware of this threat."³⁹

When the development of American-Japanese military ties is being analyzed, however, it is probably wrong to reduce the entire process to American pressure on Tokyo. Whereas the discussion of military issues in Japan was actually prohibited a few years ago, all of these matters are widely debated today. Certain groups there have representatives in political parties, the business community, the mass media and the scientific community who advocate the cancellation of existing restrictions on the country's remilitarization, including constitutional review. Prime Minister Y. Nakasone was made the head of the government precisely by these forces, and he announced literally a day before his election that he was "convinced of the need for constitutional changes"⁴⁰ (this is in reference primarily to the attempts of Japanese ruling circles to revise Article 9, containing Japan's refusal to create its own armed forces).

The position of the advocates of the more intense militarization of Japan took shape under the influence of various factors. On the one hand, there is a group of politicians with anticommunist sentiments who agree totally and completely with Reagan's view of the world. On the other, many of the advocates of remilitarization believe that Japan should not irritate Washington and should give in to American pressure, which will allow Japan to retain the ally relationship and, what is most important, the American market. There are also extremely strong nationalist aims. The Reagan Administration's desire to heighten Japan's military self-sufficiency coincides with the plans of Japanese nationalist circles to turn the country into a strong military power.

The development of American-Japanese relations in the past 4 years has led to the serious escalation of tension in the Far East. The escalation of U.S. and Japanese efforts to militarize the region has made a new round of the arms race unavoidable. The United States has involved Japan in its global anti-Soviet strategy in the hope of creating an atmosphere of constant friction in relations between the USSR and Japan. These aims are being served by the growing tendency toward remilitarization and the constant involvement of Japan in various anti-Soviet sanctions and boycotts and the encouragement of Japanese territorial claims on the USSR. Reagan Administration policy toward

Japan and the willingness of its government to turn the country into the Pentagon's nuclear hostage are completely inconsistent with the long-range interests of the Japanese people and with the cause of peace in Asia and the rest of the world.

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'NUCLEAR WINTER'--A REAL DANGER TO MANKIND

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA; POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 85 (signed to press 15 Feb. 85) pp 50-59

[Article by A. S. Ginzburg]

[Text] This is the second year that a previously unheard-of combination of words, "nuclear winter," has been used by scientists and politicians. This is not a strictly scientific term, but it is not merely a journalistic device either. "Nuclear winter" is the warning scientists are issuing to the world public about what awaits all mankind, including the inhabitants of the most remote parts of the planet, if a nuclear war should even break out on earth. A first rough definition of the term could be the following: Nuclear catastrophe will pollute the atmosphere with so much smoke and dust that the sun's rays will be unable to reach the surface of the earth and warm it.

After the atom bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, scientists from many countries studied the effects of these explosions on the population and, in part, on the environment. Around 40,000 people died directly as a result of the shock wave and radiation in Hiroshima. In subsequent months the number of victims of the bomb rose considerably as people died of leukemia and other diseases caused by the nuclear explosion. According to the estimates of the World Health Organization (WHO), by the end of 1945 around 140,000 people had already died in Hiroshima.¹ In comparison to the deaths of so many people, material losses and environmental changes might seem secondary, but raging fires, or fire storms, and "black rain," containing radioactive substances which were carried by hurricane winds far from the blast epicenters, were also recorded in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

The study of the effects of nuclear explosions was given new momentum when atomic and thermonuclear devices were tested in the atmosphere in the late 1950's and early 1960's. These tests aroused the interest of scientists in the possible effects of nuclear explosions on the atmosphere. The total force of the blasts during this period of tests was several thousand times as great as the force of the atom bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

The possibility of the destruction of the ozone layer in the earth's stratosphere, which protects all living things against lethal doses of solar ultraviolet rays, was discovered in the 1960's. During nuclear explosions in the

atmosphere, the air is heated up to temperatures of around 2,000°C. At these temperatures, the normally neutral oxygen and nitrogen form nitrogen oxides. A 1-megaton blast leads to the formation of 10^{32} molecules, or 5,000 tons, of nitrogen oxides. Each molecule of nitrogen oxide entering the stratosphere can destroy thousands of molecules of ozone as a result of a chain reaction. According to estimates, the atmospheric nuclear tests were supposed to have reduced the quantity of ozone in the earth's stratosphere by a few percentage points, but the existing nuclear stockpiles on our planet could destroy up to 70-80 percent of all the ozone. The determination of the effects of atmospheric nuclear tests on the ozone layer turned out to be an extremely complex and lengthy process. It was, not until recently that special data processing methods revealed a 2- or 3-percent decrease in the ozone content during the first half of the 1960's.

What will be the result of the further destruction of ozone? Studies of the biological and ecological effects of excessive doses of ultra-violet rays provide an answer to this question. Whereas, as everyone knows, a slight increase in exposure to erythematous rays (0.27-0.32mcm) results in a tan, dramatically increased exposure to ultra-violet rays heightens the risk of skin cancer and sun-blindness and reduces the yield of many agricultural crops. If around 90 percent of the ozone is destroyed, the possibility of which cannot be excluded in a full-scale nuclear conflict, substantial doses of solar rays in the higher ultra-violet range of 0.24-0.26mcm will reach the earth's surface. This much exposure could kill people and animals and cause the severe mutation of the majority of living organisms.

In addition to studying the effects of the destruction of the ozone layer, in the 1970's scientists paid considerable attention to the possible effects of massive nuclear explosions on big cities. For example, a UN report on nuclear weapons² said that if the atom bomb dropped on Hiroshima or Nagasaki had exploded over New York during work hours, the number of immediate deaths alone could reach a million. According to the same report, the explosion of a 1-megaton bomb could lead to the virtually complete devastation of a city with an area of 250 square kilometers. A blast of this force over a forest would start a fire covering an area of 1,000 k². According to the estimates of Soviet medical experts, if a 1-megaton bomb is dropped on a city with a population of a million, more than 300,000 people will die immediately, 200,000 will be wounded and the same number will suffer burns and shock. More than 80 percent of the physicians and medical personnel will die.³ The surviving medical personnel will be unable to help all of the injured survivors. In the opinion of Professor Bernard Lawn, co-chairman (on the U.S. side) of Physicians of the World for the Prevention of Nuclear War, modern medicine would essentially have nothing to offer, even if only purely symbolic treatment, in the event of nuclear war.

The use of several small nuclear devices would have an even more catastrophic effect on a large city. According to the same UN report, 10 explosions of 40 kilotons each (or a total of 0.4 megatons), with their epicenters located within 2 km of one another, would have more serious effects, particularly the increased number of immediate deaths, than a 1-megaton blast.

The colossal destruction, the deaths of millions of people, the radioactive contamination of large areas, the collapse of industry and agriculture, the destruction of food supplies and the disintegration of the system of health care--these and other catastrophic effects of nuclear war were realized by scientists and experts and were known to Western politicians by the beginning of the 1980's. But it was precisely then that the deployment of American medium-range missiles and cruise missiles with nuclear warheads in several West European countries began. This exacerbated the military-strategic situation on the continent dramatically and heightened the probability of nuclear war. Soviet, American and other scientists found this particularly alarming. Any intelligent person is aware of the danger of nuclear war and knows that it cannot be confined within a specific region. It will inevitably take on global dimensions and threaten the extinction of civilization.

In recent years more and more scientists in various countries have joined the struggle to prevent nuclear war and have taken part in the study of its global implications. Scientists have a great responsibility because they have considerable influence in many countries. It is extremely important that this influence be used for the good of the world, for informing people in all countries of the nature and scales of the military threat posed by imperialism.⁴ The views of Soviet scientists are close to the views of broad segments of the peace-loving foreign scientific community.

The declaration of the Pugwash Movement on the danger of nuclear war was adopted at the 1982 Warsaw conference. Copies of the declaration were sent to 156 Nobel Prize winners in physics, chemistry, physiology and medicine, and 111 of the 118 who replied consented to sign the declaration. "Therefore, the overwhelming majority of respected scientists supported the constructive program for the prevention of nuclear war."⁵

In 1983 a congress of naturalists from the FRG, United States, England, Italy, Holland and Sweden in Mainz (FRG) aroused the interest of the world public. In the "Message from Mainz," the scientists opposed the deployment of medium-range nuclear missiles.

International scientific organizations (the World Federation of Scientists, for example) have been more active in the promotion of peace and disarmament in recent years, and new organizations have been formed, primarily Physicians of the World for the Prevention of Nuclear War, in which renowned Soviet medical experts are actively involved. The WHO General Assembly passed a special resolution on the medical implications of nuclear war. In 1984 the WHO report on the effects of nuclear war on human health and public health services was published.

Soviet scientific personnel have expressed their wish for peace at the All-Union Conference of Scientists for the Deliverance of Mankind from the Threat of Nuclear War, For Disarmament and Peace (Moscow, May 1983). The conference was attended by around 500 Soviet scientists and 50 foreign scientists from 20 countries. The Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace and Against the Nuclear Threat was founded at this conference, and Academician Ye. P. Velikhov, vice president of the USSR Academy of Sciences, became its

chairman. The speeches and reports of conference speakers were published in a special issue of VESTNIK AN SSSR.⁶

There were many responses to the "Message to the Scientists of the World," signed by Soviet scientists in April 1983. The Federation of American Scientists, with around 5,000 members, responded to this message. American scientists were happy to note their solidarity with their Soviet colleagues with regard to the limitation of offensive weapons. Members of the federation attended a meeting of the committee of Soviet scientists in Tbilisi (October 1983).

The activity of scientists from different countries in the struggle against the nuclear threat has also been reflected in studies of the global implications of nuclear war. In 1982 a special issue of the international journal AMBIO,⁷ containing articles by scientists from the USSR, United States, GDR, Great Britain, France and the FRG on the possible atmospheric, ecological, medical and economic effects of nuclear war, was published in Sweden.

The climatic and ecological effects were discussed at science conferences in Moscow (May 1983) and Washington (October-November 1983). The Washington conference on "Cold and Darkness: The World After Nuclear War,"⁸ was timed to coincide with the Moscow-Washington conference call in which prominent Soviet and American scientists took part. The main conclusions of the Soviet scientists on the global implications of nuclear war were also reported at a scientific forum organized in the U.S. Congress by Senators E. Kennedy and M. Hatfield.

The term "nuclear winter," reflecting the global implications of nuclear catastrophe, began to be used in scientific periodicals and then in the mass media in 1982-1983. In 1984 "nuclear winter" was the topic of numerous seminars and meetings attended by scientists from many countries in the Soviet Union, United States, Italy, Sweden and other nations.

The scientists' research indicated that mankind has accumulated so many nuclear weapons that their use could change the state of nature on earth, and more radically than known natural disasters. In addition to the immediate destruction, the deaths of hundreds of millions of people, the radioactive contamination of vast territories and the destruction of the protective ozone layer in the stratosphere, the fire storms and many fires in cities and forests resulting from nuclear explosions would produce so much smoke and soot that they could completely change the optical properties and temperature of the atmosphere and the earth's surface.

In terms of its consequences, a nuclear conflict would differ from all previous wars and natural disasters in its colossal side-effects and secondary results, which are difficult to predict in their entirety. And the possible synergistic effect is absolutely impossible to predict because the interaction of various components of atmospheric pollution on this scale has never been observed. But it is precisely these factors that will decide the fate of the survivors of a nuclear war. Scientists still do not know all of the possible effects of nuclear war on mankind and the environment. But the reliable information which does exist already dispels all illusions about a "postwar" future even in the most remote parts of the world.

It is known that the energy of solar rays is absorbed by the surface of the earth and the ocean and partially by the atmosphere under normal conditions and that it warms them to differing degrees in different latitudes and different seasons of the year. These differing degrees of warmth put the atmosphere and ocean in motion and maintain the climate to which ecological systems and the human being have adapted. Natural and anthropogenic (resulting from world economic development) changes in climate are comparatively slow, taking many decades. The change in the climatic conditions of the atmosphere and the earth as a result of global catastrophe could be much quicker.

The use of just a fraction of existing nuclear stockpiles (10-20 percent) would start forest fires on a territory of at least a million km². Besides this, cities, industrial enterprises and oil and gas storage facilities would burn. Huge quantities of dust and other minute particles would enter the atmosphere directly as a result of the explosions. Smoke, dust and soot would reduce the sunlight reaching the earth's surface to a tenth or a hundredth of the normal amount. "Nuclear night" would fall on earth. This phenomenon was first pointed out by P. Crutzen from the Max Planck Chemistry Institute in Mainz (FRG) and J. Birks from Colorado State University (United States) in the article "The Atmosphere After a Nuclear War: Twilight at Noon."⁹ Basing their conclusions on the data of the U.S. Forest Service, they proved that forest fires on an area of approximately a million km² could emit up to 200 million tons of smoke and soot particles into the atmosphere. The larger particles would fall to earth quickly, but the smaller ones (measuring less than a micron) would form a layer 0.1-0.2 g/m² in the atmosphere over the entire northern hemisphere, and this would reduce sunlight to a fraction of the normal amount.

Along with the forest fires, urban, gas and oil fires will play an equal or perhaps more important role in the creation of "nuclear night." In large cities the density of combustible matter reaches hundreds of kilograms per square meter. During a fire storm in Hamburg (27-28 July 1943), the quantity of burned matter reached 300 kg/m². According to AMBIO, fires in the centers of world civilization will emit at least twice as much smoke and soot into the atmosphere as forest fires. Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that the particles formed when petroleum products, polymers and other substances are burned absorb much more sunlight than smoke from forest fires.

Experts on the physical properties of the atmosphere and the theory of climate in the USSR, United States and other countries have displayed an increasing interest in the past 10-15 years in the effects of atmospheric aerosols on the climate of earth and other planets and the possible changes in climate as a result of changes in the aerosol content of the atmosphere. The most significant studies are investigations of the effects of industrial aerosol and massive volcanic eruptions on climate. Besides this, such works as studies of the climatic effects of dust storms on Mars and the global pollution of the earth's atmosphere which might have taken place around 65 million years ago when an asteroid with a diameter of around 10 km fell on earth, have been quite important in the establishment of the "nuclear winter" theory.

Soviet and American climatologists have concluded that "nuclear night" will lead unavoidably to "nuclear winter." Four thorough studies of this theory

were conducted in 1983. The first is a study by American scientists who estimated the effects of fires caused by nuclear war with the aid of the model constructed for the study of the climatic disaster that is presumed to have occurred 65 million years ago.¹⁰ According to their calculations, dust in the upper layers of the atmosphere and smoke in the lower layers could lower the temperature of the earth's surface by 40-50 degrees for a period of several months after a full-scale nuclear war.

That same year the possibility of "nuclear winter" was investigated in the Computer Center of the USSR Academy of Sciences¹¹ with the aid of a model of the general circulation of the atmosphere, and scientists at the Atmospheric Physics Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences¹² studied the physical mechanism of the atmospheric and climatic effects of a nuclear conflict and conducted a comparative analysis of the "nuclear winter" phenomenon and the Martian dust storms. More detailed calculations using modern climatic models were conducted at the National Atmospheric Research Center¹³ (Colorado) and the Livermore Laboratory (California).

These works, which are distinguished by their detailed and thorough descriptions of atmospheric processes, testify that the fires caused by nuclear war will lower the temperature of the earth's surface in various regions by 20-50 degrees.

The mechanism of the transition from "nuclear night" to "nuclear winter" has been described as the following. The earth's atmosphere is a much more effective filter of sunlight than thermal radiation. As a result of this, the earth's surface is approximately 30 degrees warmer than it would be if the atmosphere could filter light and heat equally. These 30 degrees constitute the so-called hotbed or hothouse effect of the atmosphere. The emission of large quantities of particles dispersing and absorbing solar rays into the atmosphere will sharply reduce the quantity of solar energy reaching the earth's surface. Besides this, absorbent aerosol equalizes the optical properties of the atmosphere in the solar and thermal ranges of electromagnetic rays. This is why the hotbed effect of the atmosphere with a high aerosol content is weakened.

The temperature effect of aerosol is similar to a cloud in some respects. As we know, clouds in the daytime (or in summer) cool the surface of the earth by reflecting solar rays, and at night (or in winter) they reduce the cold by maintaining surface heat. In the same way, aerosol equalizes spatial and temporal temperature contrasts by regulating solar and thermal radiation in the atmosphere. On the global scale, an increase in the content of dispersing aerosol has a cooling effect due to the increased reflective capacity of the earth. This cooling effect can be compensated for in part by the heightened hotbed effect of the atmosphere through the absorption of surface warmth by "dust." The total effect depends on the optical properties and altitude of the aerosol cloud. For example, the sulfuric aerosol and solid particles entering the stratosphere after massive volcanic eruptions and remaining there for about a year lower the average surface temperature by several tenths of a degree.

Highly absorbent aerosol--smoke, soot and, in particular, the emissions of urban fires--reduces the access of solar energy to the surface much more severely than dust. Absorbent aerosol can simultaneously diminish the earth's reflective capacity. The fires result in a situation in which solar radiation is absorbed only in the atmosphere. The earth's surface is heated not by solar rays, but by atmospheric thermal radiation.

As its content of absorbent particles increases, the planet first loses its reflective capacity and it receives more solar energy, during which time the surface will be heated slightly. Later, after the severe pollution of the atmosphere with dust, solar rays will virtually stop reaching the earth's surface because they will be completely absorbed in the atmosphere, and the land surface will cool, adapting to the temperature of the aerosol layer absorbing the solar rays. As a result, the hotbed effect will cease to "work" and "nuclear winter" will arrive. The land surface will cool, and the sun-heated smoke could fill the entire troposphere over the northern hemisphere and begin moving into the southern one. Over the oceans, on the other hand, the cloud of smoke will have a perceptible warming effect. The ocean, in contrast to the land, has colossal thermal inertia and loses heat essentially as a result of its surface heat, which passes through the atmosphere into space. A smoke-filled atmosphere over the ocean will absorb the sunlight and heat of the slowly cooling ocean and will therefore become even warmer.

The contrasting temperatures of the ocean and land will give rise to a situation well known to meteorologists--the winter monsoon or dry season in South and Southeast Asia--but much more intensive, with storms and rainfall in coastal regions and drought on the continents.

Changes in atmospheric circulation will take place in coastal regions and on the global scale at the edge of the growing portion of the atmosphere filled with smoke and dust. The contrasting temperatures of the already polluted and still clean areas will intensify the circulation of air and contribute to the spread of pollution. The penetration of the southern hemisphere by isolated strong currents of polluted air from the north will quickly fill the southern hemisphere with smoke. All atmospheric circulation will be fundamentally changed during the global development of atmospheric pollution by the products of nuclear explosions and fires. Global processes in the atmosphere are generally caused by equatorial-polar temperature gradients. During the development of the "nuclear winter," atmospheric circulation will depend on contrasts between the rapidly cooling dry land and the slowly cooling ocean and between the clean and polluted parts of the atmosphere.

Changes in general atmospheric circulation will form pockets of severe cold during the "nuclear winter." For example, the model of the USSR Academy of Sciences Computer Center showed a drop of 50° in the temperature in Europe and the Arabian peninsula, of 40° on Kamchatka and in the American northeast, of 30-35° in Alaska and the American northwest, and of 20° in Central America a month after the beginning of a nuclear conflict involving the use of 1,000 megaton weapons.

For a full description of these effects, we should bear in mind that the fires in cities and forests will last weeks, a dense cloud of small smoke and dust

particles will cover the southern hemisphere as well as the northern one within a month, the earth's surface will cool to below 0°C even in the tropics, snow will fall in coastal regions, a drought will begin on the continents and a long and dark winter night will begin for mankind.

When the "nuclear winter" theory is discussed, people sometimes ask whether there is some kind of phenomenon in nature that is at least partially similar to this phenomenon. As mentioned above, the global dust storms on Mars represent a real and well-documented planetary analogue to the climatic effects of nuclear war. They also perceptibly cool the surface of the planet and heat its atmosphere. The dust storms on Mars have been absorbed from earth by astronomers since the end of the 18th century. They are usually observed at times of pronounced opposition, when Mars is closest to the earth and the sun. During these periods, it receives around 20 percent more solar energy than the average, due to its oblong orbit. Dust clouds take shape primarily in the moderate latitudes of the southern hemisphere of Mars in late spring and early summer. They have a diurnal development cycle, displaying strong growth by evening and subsiding during the night, but atmospheric pollution increases on the average. Within a few days dust covers the entire latitudinal belt and then begins spreading meridionally. Within about 2 weeks a shroud of dust covers the entire planet. The polluted Martian atmosphere, absorbing the solar rays, heats up by around 20-30° and becomes even slightly warmer than the surface, which is 10-15° cooler than normal during the dust storms. The dust shroud not only eliminates the hotbed effect of the atmosphere but also creates what is called the anti-hotbed effect, when the surface is colder than the atmosphere. This description of a global dust storm on Mars is not hypothetical, but is absolutely true and is based on the results of measurements on Soviet and American interplanetary stations.

It is possible that during the human race's existence, the earth has not experienced any global and dramatic aerosol "pollutions" of the atmosphere of the type regularly occurring on Mars. But it is also possible that the asteroid which is presumed to have fallen on earth around 65 million years ago sent so much dust into the atmosphere that it caused an "asteroid night" followed by an "asteroid winter." Many scientists believe that this kind of climatic catastrophe could have led to the extinction of the dinosaurs and other animals. Paleontological data indicate that the majority of species weighing over 25 kg disappeared from the face of the earth within a geologically short period of time approximately this many years ago.

As for events of which mankind has reliable proof, we could mention volcanic eruptions. Their destructive force is colossal. For example, as a result of an eruption on the island of Santorin (in the Mediterranean) in around 1500 BC, the island actually ceased to exist. The energy released during the eruption caused a tidal wave reaching 30 meters in height, which devastated Crete and then flooded the Nile delta a few hours later and destroyed a port located a thousand kilometers from the site of the eruption. Obviously, the strongest eruption of the last century was the eruption of Tamboro, a volcano in Indonesia, in 1815. It sent 150 km³ of matter into the air. Dust clouds spread over huge areas. The year following the eruption, 1816, was known as the "year without summer" in North America and Western Europe. In the United

States, snow fell in June of that year and there were frosts in July and August. The latest grape harvest between 1782 and 1856 was recorded that year in Switzerland and France. In England, Switzerland and the northern United States, that was the coldest summer since the beginning of meteorological observations. It is possible that the cholera epidemic in Bengal at the time of the crop failure and famine of the extraordinarily cold year of 1816 was one of the results of the eruption of Tamboro. In 1823 the cholera reached the Caucasus, and in 1830-1832 it spread to Europe and North America. A temperature drop of a few degrees for one summer can have such lethal effects. It is difficult to even imagine the catastrophic effects of a temperature drop of dozens of degrees throughout the world as a result of the onset of "nuclear winter."

As for major fires on our planet, the most fully researched is the fire that started in summer 1950 in the Canadian province of Alberta, which created a gigantic smoke cloud. Rising to several kilometers above the earth, it began moving east and then crossed the Atlantic Ocean and was observed in Western Europe at an altitude of 8-10 km. This testifies that there are processes in the atmosphere carrying a smoke cloud to the upper strata and carrying smoke over long distances.

The basic assumptions and beliefs about the physical mechanisms of global "nuclear night" or "nuclear winter" were essentially verbalized in full in 1983. It was learned that mankind had the unfortunate ability to pollute the atmosphere to such an extent by an exchange of nuclear strikes that the temperature of the entire land surface could drop dozens of degrees and darkness could cover the entire globe. The further development of research took the following directions: the investigation of the ecological effects of "nuclear winter" and the clarification of the exact physical processes occurring in the atmosphere and on the earth's surface as a result of numerous nuclear explosions and the resulting fires leading to "nuclear winter." An example of the first field of research can be found in the report of the Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace and Against the Nuclear Threat, "The Global Effects of Nuclear War and the Developing Countries" (1984). The report says that although contemporary science is still incapable of completely assessing the lethal effects of "nuclear winter" and other effects of nuclear war on ecological systems, agriculture and the economy, the effects that can be predicted are sufficient grounds for the prediction of the inevitable disappearance of tropical farming in Africa and in the Asian and Latin American countries. Southern cultures will not only be killed by the effects of the cold and darkness of "nuclear winter," but will actually be impossible to regenerate due to the cessation of deliveries of pesticides, fungicides and other chemicals from the developed countries. The tropical forests, one of the main sources of oxygen and carriers of organic life on earth, will be destroyed even by the short-term effects of darkness and frost, as they can exist only within a severely limited climatic range and cannot survive abrupt fluctuations in temperature and light. Nuclear war would doom the population of the developing countries to cold, hunger, disease and eventual extinction.

As for physical and meteorological problems, virtually no scientist now has any doubt that the smoke and soot distributed uniformly through the atmosphere

will cool the land surface on earth. Hypotheses about massive fires and the large-scale spread of smoke and the flushing of aerosol particles from the atmosphere entail the greatest difficulty. It is understandable that these processes cannot be studied experimentally on their actual scales. Analytical research and the quantitative modeling of these processes require considerable effort on the part of many teams of scientists. Even our present assumptions about physical processes in the atmosphere and on the earth's surface, however, validate the developments that might lead to "nuclear winter."

In May 1984 an international seminar was held in Leningrad to discuss the "climatic effects of nuclear war and their impact on the biosphere." It was attended by around 50 scientists from 9 countries: the USSR, United States, Great Britain, France, Australia, Japan, Denmark, Sweden and Spain. The scientists agreed that a nuclear conflict will promise mankind and all life on earth a "nuclear winter," which will be fatal for the survivors.

The existence of global climatic implications of nuclear war was firmly established through the joint efforts of scientists from various countries, especially Soviets and Americans. But there are also "attempts by some scientific engineers and builders of American nuclear weapons to put these conclusions in question and produce research findings meeting the requests of aggressive politicians."¹⁴

In August 1984 an article by E. Teller was printed in NATURE magazine, "Widespread Aftereffects of a Nuclear War,"¹⁵ in which he suggested that the radioactivity which was considered to be catastrophic in the 1960's and 1970's and the depletion of the ozone layer seem unimportant in comparison to the immediate losses resulting from nuclear explosions. In Teller's opinion, the vague data about the quantity of smoke produced by "nuclear fires" and about the development of meteorological processes question the validity of the statements about the apocalyptic effect of "nuclear winter."

In this context, the results of certain calculations are discussed in the article and references are made to possible atmospheric processes that might flush the smoke out of the atmosphere more quickly and thereby reduce the cooling of the land. Teller calls the arguments of his opponents unconvincing. But this applies much more to Teller's own arguments. After all, in addition to processes intensifying the flushing effect, other processes in the atmosphere accelerate the vertical and horizontal proliferation of pollutants. And it is precisely these processes that are activated dramatically when large smoke and soot clouds are present in the atmosphere.

At the same time that the issue of NATURE containing this article came out, the results of studies by Soviet and American scientists, indicating the possibility that the atmosphere could be filled rapidly with smoke, were discussed in Tallin at the ninth international conference on the physical properties of clouds.

Of course, the work on the "nuclear winter" theory has not been completed, but even its opponents have to admit that the possibility of "nuclear winter" cannot be excluded.

Under the pressure of politicians and scientists with a realistic frame of mind, the U.S. administration has allocated 50 million dollars for a 5-year program of study of the planetary effects of nuclear war.

It is necessary "for this kind of research to be combined with work to thoroughly inform the public of the importance of established conclusions, and for it not to be combined with the continuation of the arms race and the elaboration of theories about various 'improved' and 'scientifically sound' varieties of nuclear war. This must be vigilantly opposed by the opinion of the world scientific community, capable of arming the defenders of peace with objective arguments."¹⁶

The hypothesis of "nuclear winter" and the subsequent elaboration of theories about the climatic effects of nuclear war will serve as sound arguments in the struggle of scientists and all peace-loving forces against the danger of nuclear war.

Soviet scientists, just as scientists in other countries, must bring all of the scientific facts about the real possibility of a nuclear climatic catastrophe to the attention of the world public in addition to conducting concrete scientific studies of the planetary effects of nuclear war.

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CONGRESSIONAL ACTIONS ON U.S.-SOVIET TRADE CRITICIZED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 85 (signed to press 15 Feb 85) pp 74-81

[Article by Ye. V. Prokudin: "Congress and American-Soviet Trade"]

[Text] There have been some recent positive changes in the sphere of Soviet-American commercial relations. At the beginning of 1985, official delegations from the two countries met in Moscow for the first time in 6 years to discuss ways of developing bilateral trade and eliminating existing obstacles. This applied above all to the relevant American legislation. This is why the administration will have to work with the Congress if it is actually willing to appreciably improve commercial and economic relations with the USSR.

According to the American Constitution, it is precisely the prerogative of the legislative branch to regulate economic relations with foreign states and define the powers of the executive branch in this sphere. We will trace the evolution of attitudes in the Congress from the mid-1970's to the present time and will take note of the areas in which Congress could be receptive to possible moves to improve the terms of bilateral trade. This is made all the more pertinent by the commencement of the 99th Congress' work and the intention of U.S. business groups interested in trade with our country to make an effort to direct the attention of the legislators and the public to this problem.

Throughout the entire postwar period the U.S. Congress has been a largely negative force in the development of the American approach to trade with the USSR. In the past decade this was most clearly reflected in the passage of trade and credit legislation discriminating against socialist countries in December 1974 (the Jackson-Vanik amendment to the 1974 Trade Act and the Stevenson amendment to the 1945 act on the powers of the Export-Import Bank), which blocked the Nixon Administration's efforts to normalize the conditions of bilateral trade and was one of the first serious blows against detente.¹

The practice of linking trade with political demands was contrary to the earlier USSR-U.S. governmental agreement on mutual and unconditional most-favored-nation status. Congress' uncereemonious attempt to politicize trade represented flagrant interference in Soviet internal affairs. As a result, the intergovernmental trade agreement of 18 October 1972 could not go into effect.

When we view this congressional action from the historical standpoint, we must admit that, in comparison to Washington's economic blockade of more than 20 years against the socialist countries, the provisions of the 1974 Trade Act reflect the definite evolution of the American approach to this matter--from the doctrine of "economic warfare" to the theory of "trade with a political opponent for the sake of political goals." This theory is aimed at undermining the socialist countries from within and weakening the unity of the socialist community.

Since that time--that is, since 1975--neither Congress nor the administration has made any serious attempt to revise existing discriminatory trade and credit legislation. The almost identical bills of Senator A. Stevenson and Congressman L. AuCoin, submitted to the Congress in February 1979, during the period of preparations for the summit meeting in Vienna, were the only proposals aimed at modifying sections of the law pertaining to the socialist countries. The bills envisaged the repeal of one of the most odious points in the Jackson-Vanik amendment--the demand for "assurances" from the socialist countries regarding the liberalization of their emigration policy--and the President's power to decide for himself whether the policies of a specific country accord with the principle of "free emigration." The practice of "linking" the normalization of trade with the domestic policy of socialist states was left inviolable.² Incidentally, the Carter Administration's ambiguous approach to these bills and the subsequent exacerbation of American-Soviet relations in 1980 impeded their thorough discussion in Congress.

The suspicion of the Soviet Union and hostility toward the policy of detente, cultivated by U.S. reactionary groups, caused the rightward shift in Congress' position on matters of bilateral relations and the abrupt reversal toward confrontation with the USSR, which was undertaken by the Carter Administration on the pretext of the events in Afghanistan. Congress not only supported the sweeping anti-Soviet campaign and the "sanctions" announced by the President against the USSR, but in some cases went even further, almost insisting on the complete curtailment of trade, economic, scientific and technical contacts. Hearings were held before various congressional committees at the beginning of 1980 to prove that the development of bilateral relations in these spheres could be "ruinous" for the United States.

A gradual sobering-up process began in the middle of 1980, when it became obvious that the main instrument of the policy of "sanctions"--the partial embargo on grain sales to the USSR--had injured the interests of the United States itself, especially the interests of farmers. Subsequent U.S. calculations, which are frequently cited by some congressmen, testify, for example, that the use of grain exports as a political weapon reduced national production volume by 11.4 billion dollars, caused the loss of 310,000 jobs and cost the American taxpayers more than 2 billion dollars in federal grain price supports. But these immediate losses cannot compare to the injuries resulting from the United States' loss of its reputation as a reliable trade partner.

The "boomerang effect" of the grain embargo was so painful to American agriculture that legislators have been trying to restore the United States' reputation ever since the embargo was lifted in April 1981. Some examples

are the series of amendments passed by Congress between 1981 and 1984 to seriously restrict the President's power to impose embargos on exports of agricultural goods. In December 1981, for example, the agriculture and food act was amended to effectively prohibit the curtailment or limitation of the sale of agricultural products to any country accounting for over 3 percent of American exports of these products, with the stipulation that the ban or restriction cannot extend to all of the goods exported to a country. If the President should nevertheless institute a restriction or ban, the law obligates him to pay farmers substantial sums in compensation. In July 1982, just half a year after the President's decision to refuse to negotiate a new long-range agreement on grain with the Soviet Union on the pretext of the events in Poland, plans to override Reagan's decision were outlined in both houses of Congress.

In January 1983 a congressional amendment on the "inviolability of contracts" to the commercial futures act of 1982 went into effect. It guarantees the continuation of the fulfillment of contracts for agricultural shipments for 9 months after the imposition of a presidential embargo on their export, with the exception of cases in which the President declares a state of emergency in the nation or Congress declares war.

In spring 1983 Congress began to exert much stronger pressure on the administration for the negotiation of a new long-range agreement with the Soviet Union on grain shipments. On 21 March 1983, 20 members of the House of Representatives submitted a draft resolution asking the President to resume these talks with the USSR without delay. They substantiated the need for this by warning that the "absence of an agreement could lead to instability in U.S. agricultural markets, reduce exports of these goods and compound the deficit in the national balance of trade." In the Senate on that same day, influential Republicans C. Percy (Illinois) and R. Dole (Kansas) submitted a similar draft. It was approved by the Senate on 25 May 1983. It is significant that the Reagan Administration had changed its mind not long before this and had announced that the United States was willing to start negotiating a new agreement with the USSR on trade in some agricultural goods, and this agreement was then concluded in August 1983.

Congress displayed a much more contradictory position in the 1981-1982 debates on the participation of West European countries in the construction of the Urenga-Uzhgorod pipeline and the shipments of products of American companies for this project.³ In June 1981, for example, 50 members of Congress sent the President a letter to inform him that the pipeline represented a serious threat to Western security and proposed that alternative sources of energy be found for the West European allies. At that time, the House of Representatives passed a resolution advising against U.S. participation in this project.

In this way, Congress encouraged the administration to actively oppose the most important transaction in East-West economic relations but then, after the shameful failure of the next series of "sanctions,"⁴ it began to display concern about their negative effects on the international operations of American companies and U.S. foreign policy. According to the estimates of government experts, for example, just the direct losses of American companies

as a result of the "sanctions" connected with the pipeline project amounted to around 1.2 billion dollars over the 3 years during which deliveries would have been made. Besides this, contracts lost when the reputation of American companies as partners in world trade was undermined, which cannot be estimated in quantitative terms, must also be taken into account. As a result, Congress' position on this matter began to change radically.

The cancellation of the export controls was initiated by Republican Congressman P. Findley (Illinois), with the active support of R. Michel, Republican House minority leader. The two congressmen thereby expressed the interests of Caterpillar Tractor and Fiat-Allis, the Illinois companies which had suffered the most from the administration's actions.

In spite of White House pressure, the House Foreign Affairs Committee approved the Findley bill on 10 August 1982, but a meeting of the entire House of Representatives rejected the bill, although by the most minimal of majorities (206 against 203), on 29 September 1982. At the suggestion of Republican Congressman W. Broomfield (Michigan), the bill was amended to stipulate that control over exports to the USSR would be cancelled within 90 days if the administration should submit proof to Congress during this period that no "forced labor" was being used in the pipeline project. This time the bill was supported by 209 members of the House, with only 197 voting against it, and was turned over to the Senate. Soon afterward, the administration gave in to pressure from American business groups and the West European allies and lifted the abovementioned restrictions on exports to the USSR itself.

It must be said, however, that the provocative ultra-rightwing intrigues revolving around the far-fetched notion about the use of "forced labor" in the USSR, chosen as the latest pretext for interference in American-Soviet trade, did not cease in the 98th Congress. The leader was Republican Senator W. Armstrong (Colorado). The subject was brought up again in September 1983, when a draft resolution on the Korean airliner incident was being discussed in the Congress. This time it was suggested that the provisions of the 1930 tariffs act be used to prohibit U.S. imports of several Soviet goods. Although this amendment was rejected, Congress nevertheless passed its notorious resolution No 100 in November 1983, which "condemns forced labor in the Soviet Union." As PRAVDA commented in this connection on 7 December 1983, the resolution is "an indicative little example of an anti-Soviet concoction."

In March 1984 Republican Congressman E. Rudd (Arizona) and nine other members of the House submitted a new draft resolution calling for the immediate restriction of U.S. imports of several Soviet goods. By May of the same year, 48 congressmen were already making the same demands in a letter to the Department of the Treasury. A committee on international trade was asked to prepare a special report on U.S. imports of goods allegedly produced in other countries with the use of "forced labor." The Americans themselves were worried that further actions motivated by anti-Soviet sentiment could lead to a situation which was described by the NEW YORK TIMES in the following way on 20 March 1984: "After getting out of one hole, we (the United States--Ye. P.) are digging ourselves an even deeper hole."

All of this testifies once again to the continuous attempts of the most reactionary forces in Congress to put an end to trade relations with the USSR.

Important aspects of American-Soviet trade were investigated more thoroughly by the U.S. Congress during the discussion of bills on the modification and extension of the 1979 export regulation act, which expired on 30 September 1983. The renewal of export controls was a central item on the agenda of the 98th Congress.⁵

As a result of the deeply conflicting views of the administration and the Congress on key provisions of the new legislation after a year and a half of intensive discussion, it was not until spring 1984 that both houses were able to approve the corresponding bills, although even these differed significantly from one another (the House bill was approved on 27 October 1983, and the Senate bill on 1 March 1984). Under these conditions, the President dated the renewal of the 1979 act up to the date of the passage of new legislation. Despite the lengthy discussions of the bills in a conference committee and the attempts to reach a compromise, the 98th Congress was unable to pass a new law on export regulation. The new Congress is expected to approve this kind of legislation during the first 6 months of its work.

One of the main reasons for the difficulties involved in the renewal of the 1979 act was the administration's practice of using this law as the legal basis for trade "sanctions" affecting the economic and political interests of influential American forces. For this reason, the very discussion of export controls in the Congress became the first opportunity in 4 years for all concerned groups to express their feelings about this practice and map out a consensus for the future. The most heated debates concerned the use of export control for the attainment of foreign policy goals.

We should recall that the predecessor of this export regulation legislation, the 1949 export control act, was once the main legislative act in the economic sphere heralding the start of the "cold war." Although it was formally intended to prevent U.S. exports of goods and technology with undesirable national security implications to all countries (with the exception of Canada), in practice the law led primarily to the almost complete curtailment of trade with socialist states. It was not revised substantially until 1969, when the pressure of the American business community led to the legislative reinforcement of the tendency toward the considerable liberalization of export controls in the interests of mutually beneficial relations with socialist countries. Later, especially in the 1970's, numerous changes were made in the export regulation act to simplify and accelerate the issuance of export licenses and to shorten the list of goods subject to control. Nevertheless, as American legislators themselves have admitted, this law remained a much more unwieldy export control mechanism, with a product list covering a broader range, than in other developed capitalist countries (according to the testimony of congressmen, it extended to 100,000-200,000 types of goods and technologies).

The criticism of the policy of trade "sanctions" and embargos in the Congress points up the fact that the United States is the only country in the world to use trade restrictions to impose its wishes on other states. According to the

estimates of the American Institute of World Economics, the United States has resorted to economic "sanctions" for the attainment of foreign policy goals 49 times since the war. When many congressmen cite these data, however, they are objecting only to the ease with which the administration interferes in trade for the sake of dubious objectives.

The contradictory approach of the legislators to this matter was clearly reflected in the fact that although there was general criticism of the ineffectiveness of the policy of "sanctions," neither the House nor the Senate tried to deprive the President of the right to arbitrarily interfere in trade, but simply proposed that these cases be limited by various "criteria" and that the possible losses of American losses be reduced by offering specific guarantees of the fulfillment of earlier contracts. As a result, not one of the proposals submitted for inclusion in the new export legislation can allay the fears about the reliability of American companies as trade partners. Although the Senate version, which the business community seems to prefer, stipulates that contracts signed prior to the banning of exports should be honored, it also contains a special provision abrogating this condition in the event of a "state of economic emergency." This term, however, is not defined precisely in the law, and the Senate, judging by the nature of its discussions, gives it an extremely broad interpretation. The administration, on the other hand, is making every effort to soften the wording of the provision on the "inviolability of contracts" in the new legislation. Furthermore, the Senate bill even proposes that the executive branch be granted the power to ban imports from the countries to which exports are restricted for foreign policy reasons.

Equally serious differences of opinion were revealed by the discussion of the use of export controls for "national security" reasons. This revealed the conflicting views of business groups with an interest in heightening the competitive potential of American goods on world markets under the conditions of the unprecedented growth of the deficit in the U.S. balance of trade, and of influential forces wanting more rigid export controls in view of the alleged leaks of advanced technology to the USSR and other socialist countries.

The approach of the House of Representatives to this matter reflects an effort to relax restrictions on exports of the latest American technology within the COCOM framework. It is obvious that this position is consistent with the interest of American TNC's in facilitating technology transfers to their overseas branches and affiliates. Under certain conditions, unilateral export control is also to be relaxed by excluding comparatively high-tech goods possessed by other countries in sufficient quantities.

This aspect of export control was discussed in a completely different atmosphere in the Senate, where the tone of the debates was set by such conservative senators as Republicans J. Heinz, J. Garn and W. Armstrong and Democrat W. Proxmire (all of them, incidentally, are also members of the 99th Congress). Their views are expressed in a provision included in the preamble to the bill, that "the transfer of security-related technology and goods to the USSR or other countries whose actions or policies injure U.S. national security will lead to the considerable reinforcement of the Soviet bloc's military-industrial potential, increase the threat to the security of the United States,

its allies and friendly countries and increase U.S. expenditures on defense." The Senate bill contained proposals aimed at stricter export control, primarily through the imposition of the American approach on Western Europe and Japan, envisaging the curtailment of trade with the socialist countries. It also gives the administration sweeping powers during COCOM negotiations with allies to heighten the "effectiveness" of this organization.

The senators voted to strengthen the role of the Defense Department in the control of exports of advanced technology to non-socialist countries as well and approved the administration's line of putting pressure on neutral countries to limit their exports of technology to the USSR. In an attempt to block all channels of "leaks" of Western technology to the Soviet Union, they included a provision in the bill essentially declaring the U.S. right of the unilateral oversight of the observance by West European firms of restrictions stipulated in the American export regulation act and COCOM-negotiated restrictions.⁶ This proposal goes much further than the usual U.S. claims about the extraterritorial force of the export regulation act. During the discussion of this matter, Senator J. Garn said: "To put it plainly, the Europeans can go to Hell if they do not accept our way of thinking." This attitude naturally aroused vehement protests in Western Europe.

To heighten the effectiveness of control over the observance of export regulations, the Senate bill proposed that some functions in this area be turned over to the Customs Service of the Treasury Department, and also asked the President to consider the creation of a special export control agency, headed by a federal official (the House wants the Department of Commerce to retain these control functions, but has stipulated that its budget will have to be increased and its structure will have to be modified accordingly).

Regardless of the final form of the new export regulation act after the conference committee is through with it, the discussions in Congress indicate that when legislators try to reconcile the broad interpretation of national security interests with the need to strengthen the competitive position of U.S. companies in world trade, they frequently make compromises at the expense of American business by limiting opportunities to export goods to the socialist markets. The business community's demands for the restoration of the reputation of American firms as reliable trade partners, judging by all indications, are being sacrificed to the need to retain the ability to intervene in trade for the sake of political goals. The only logical result of this policy, however, is a return to the self-isolation of the United States in East-West trade, characteristic of the 1950's and 1960's.

An analysis of the evolution of congressional views on American-Soviet trade over the past decade testifies that the deadlock created by the legislators has not been surmounted in the normalization of this trade. The American side has not even made any serious attempts to do this. The clear reversal toward confrontation in official Washington policy and the rightward shift in the legislators' attitudes at the beginning of the 1980's might not have removed the resolution of the problem of discrimination in trade and economic relations between the two countries from the agenda, but it did postpone it for a long time. The results of the last decade also indicate that Congress'

attitudes frequently coincide with the administration's approach to American-Soviet trade. This similarity of views is no coincidence, as the changes in the ruling elite have affected the legislators as well as the executive branch. Common class goals, however, do not always exclude the possibility of heated battles between different political forces in Congress, whose interests conflict quite frequently in the area of trade with the USSR. In spite of all the serious disagreements among legislators and the reinforcement of conservative views among them, Congress nevertheless opposed the administration on some matters by demanding certain changes in trade policy toward the USSR, and these demands were carried out. The continuous struggle among legislators over certain aspects of American-Soviet trade tends to make the administration's position more pragmatic. All of this attests to the conflicting effects of Congress on recent U.S. trade policy. It is clear, however, that real progress in the normalization of American-Soviet trade relations on the basis of equality, mutual advantage and a total lack of discrimination is still being impeded by negative tendencies in the highest U.S. legislative body.

The Soviet Union has always taken a clear and consistent stand on trade with the United States. It was verbalized at the 26th CPSU Congress and has been clarified in repeated statements by Soviet leaders. As General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium K. U. Chernenko said in a conversation with prominent American businessman A. Hammer in December 1984, the USSR is in favor of the development of mutually beneficial trade and economic relations with the United States if all of the artificial obstacles can be removed from its path.

FOOTNOTES

1. We should recall that the Jackson-Vanik amendment links the granting of the United States' customary non-discriminatory status (the so-called most-favored-nation status) in trade and the extension of government export credit to socialist countries with the emigration policies of these states. The Stevenson amendment envisages the limitation of U.S. Export-Import Bank credit for transactions with the USSR to only 300 million dollars over 4 years. Furthermore, even within this limit there is a ban on the extension of credit and guarantees on sales of American goods and services connected with the extraction of mineral sources of energy.
2. According to the proposed changes, the most-favored-nation status and government credit could be granted to a country not eligible for them by the terms of the 1974 trade act, for an initial period of 1 year with the possibility of subsequent renewal for 5 years. The overall limit on Eximbank credit to the USSR, the restrictions on energy sources and some other restrictions on the crediting of American exports to the Soviet Union would be cancelled. Nevertheless, the President retained the power to cancel all of the tariff privileges and credit of a socialist country if he should find its emigration policy unsatisfactory.
3. For more detail, see T. V. Kobushko, "Washington Opposes the 'Gas for Pipes' Project," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1982, No 12--Editor's note.

4. In December 1981 the U.S. President announced a transfer to the individual licensing of exports of oil and gas transport and refining equipment and materials to the USSR. In June 1982 the restriction was extended to the overseas branches of American firms and foreign companies producing such equipment on American licenses.
5. For more detail, see T. N. Yudina, "Some Foreign Policy Issues in the 98th Congress," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1985, No 1--Editor's note.
6. For more detail, see A. V. Kunitsyn, "Weapon of Trade Warfare," ibid., 1984, No 8--Editor's note.

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BOOK ON STALEMATE IN ARMS CONTROL REVIEWED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 85 (signed to press 15 Feb 85) pp 104-106

[Review by A. A. Lebedeva of book "Deadly Gambits. The Reagan Administration and the Stalemate in Nuclear Arms Control" by Strobe Talbott, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1984, XIV + 380 pages]

[Text] This book with the eloquent title "Deadly Gambits" was written by TIME's diplomatic correspondent. For 13 years Talbott has been covering foreign affairs for the magazine. Besides this, he is the author of major studies of international relations, for which he was awarded a special prize in 1981. Talbott is renowned in the international academic community for such books as "Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II" (1979) and "The Russians and Reagan" (1984).*

Here the author concentrates on the issue of arms control--that is, the limitation and reduction of strategic arms and of medium-range weapons. In essence, however, the book deals with the impasse the Reagan Administration reached in decisions on these matters and on matters connected with the establishment of an effective system to oversee the observance of treaties and agreements.

The author, a well-informed expert, has depicted the workings of official Washington foreign policy more than once in his works. In this book, Talbott again reveals the maneuvers and intrigues of opposing groups in the White House, Pentagon, State Department and other American agencies involved in the arms control decisionmaking process. He describes the fierce struggle over this issue and over all aspects of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Talbott describes the interaction of various echelons of power pursuing their own selfish goals, the clash of personal interests and the rivalry of the ambitious "young and energetic" advisers who make policy for Reagan--a man who, in the author's opinion, does not know enough about the fundamental aspects of various issues and simply tries to reconcile various points of view in his administration, expressed first by Haig, then by Shultz and then by

* For a review of this book, see SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1985, No 1--Editor's note.

Weinberger (pp 10-11). The author cites numerous facts to explain why the nuclear arms reduction and limitation talks were broken off, but since he does not take a discerning approach to published U.S. administration data on the quantity of these arms in Europe, his analysis does not reveal the real state of affairs.

Talbott tries to take an objective approach to the most complex and extremely important issues in contemporary international relations, but in his assessments of Soviet behavior he is not always able to divest himself of the characteristic prejudices of a bourgeois academic. For example, in Talbott's opinion, the Soviet Union has frequently displayed unjustified rigidity and a reluctance to make "acceptable" compromises. The facts testify, however, that the USSR has always been firm and consistent in insisting on the observance of the equality and equivalent security of the negotiating sides, and it is understandable that it could not consent to the unilateral advantages the United States has tried, and is still trying, to obtain at the expense of the other side's security.

The author has collected extensive documented information of indisputable interest, particularly from the historical standpoint. Talbott not only presents a chronological overview of the different stages of the arms control talks, but also tries to warn the United States not to repeat its past mistakes. He makes the accurate remark that the Reagan Administration's approaches and principles in this area can be changed or even abandoned altogether, but its actions will not go unnoticed and will have far-reaching consequences which the international community will find difficult to ignore.

Talbott says that the history of arms control has gone through different periods: There were periods of productive cooperation between the two great powers and there were periods of stagnation. But now, he insists, the international situation is such that the world needs strategic arms limitation and reduction agreements more than ever before. There is also an increase, however, in the obstacles blocking these agreements. The efforts of politicians to seek suitable methods of control cannot keep up with the development of new weapons. Furthermore, ever since Reagan took office, Talbott writes, decisions on arms control have been made by people with a critical attitude toward the experience accumulated by the three previous administrations. "Several individuals in key positions...believe," he says, "that SALT and other agreements of the period of detente...helped to strengthen the Soviet threat instead of eliminating it" (p XII). As for arms control, in the opinion of these individuals, the approaches of previous administrations weakened American defense. For 3 years, the author states, Washington reviewed its objectives in this area. This led to an unprecedented crisis in the history of arms control and gave rise to serious difficulties and friction in relations between the United States and its West European allies, in the interaction of the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. Government and in Soviet-American relations (p XII).

The Reagan Administration's attempts to talk to the Soviet Union from a position of strength and force the Soviet side to make substantial concessions at the talks were unsuccessful, the author writes. The situation which took

shape after the beginning of the deployment of American missiles in Western Europe not only disrupted the talks on the limitation of medium-range nuclear arms but also stopped the talks on the limitation and reduction of strategic weapons, which had a negative effect on the Vienna talks on the reduction of armed forces and arms in Central Europe (pp 3-4).

Analyzing the current administration's position, Talbott notes that Reagan took office with the intention of impeding bilateral Soviet-American talks and eventually undermining them. He concentrated all efforts on the buildup of arms.

As a result, the Reagan Administration accomplished not a revolution, as people in Washington have declared, but a restoration, Talbott says--that is, a return to the relations existing prior to detente (p 343). Under pressure from its allies, the administration had to enter into negotiations in 1981 and 1982 and then "modify" its proposals in 1983, but none of this took matters beyond a standstill. The President's statements about his desire for positive results at the strategic arms limitation talks remained nothing more than rhetoric. He was also unable to resolve differences of opinion on the bureaucratic level, Talbott says. The skirmishes over these matters among various groups in the Reagan Administration are still going on. The Pentagon has taken a hard line with regard to the talks, and the State Department has advocated compromise. All of this, Talbott feels, has paralyzed the capacity to seek solutions (p 345).

In a discussion of possible solutions to the problems facing the administration, Talbott expresses his point of view: He believes that strategic arms talks should concentrate first on outlining at least the approximate framework of agreements acceptable to both sides. He suggests that this could be followed by the clarification of objectives--that is, the negotiation of general limits, envisaging the establishment of one ceiling for launchers and another for airborne arms and warheads, including cruise missiles. Incidentally, the author admits that these proposals were made previously, but were rejected by the Pentagon (pp 347-348).

The line of the Republican administration in the sphere of strategic arms limitation during Reagan's first term in office could lead to a total fiasco, Talbott states. The administration, he feels, should give up the aims with which it entered the White House. Reagan's so-called revolution in arms control is over, Talbott writes (p 352).

It is hardly likely, however, that all of the problems in the negotiation of nuclear arms limitation and control can be blamed, as Talbott does, only on bureaucratic, interdepartmental squabbles in the Reagan Administration, and it is hardly likely that personnel changes in the American echelons of power will change the existing state of affairs. As a matter of fact, the Reagan Administration's maneuvers were made in pursuit of the goal of military-strategic superiority. This is the real cause.

It is absolutely impossible to agree with some of Talbott's remarks. For example, in his opinion, nuclear weapons are of exceptional political, and

not military, importance. The author writes that they represent a "symbol of power." By manipulating them, a state can attain purely political goals (p 5). Talbott asserts that the United States is participating in the arms race only for the sake of its political goals, and also for the repulsion of the "Soviet threat" if the need for this should arise (p 6).

This is an extremely dangerous misconception! The world public is fully aware of the belligerent theories of American militarism that Washington is trying to implement. The deployment of the new nuclear missiles on the European continent, the attempts to transfer the arms race into space, the thesis of the possibility of fighting "limited" and "protracted" nuclear wars, the plans to deliver the first nuclear strike against the Soviet Union and many other factors testify that the American leadership certainly does not regard nuclear weapons only as a political instrument.

The title of Talbott's book is "Deadly Gambits." In general, this author likes to take the names of his works from chess terminology. But the "chess games" Washington is playing do not entail moving pieces around on a board. These "games" can affect the future of people and the future of all civilization on earth and can be extremely dangerous.

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BOOKS ON SOCIAL FACTORS IN JAPAN'S TECHNOLOGICAL SUCCESS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 85 (signed to press 15 Feb 85) pp 106-110

[Review by G. B. Kochetkov of books (I) "The Fifth Generation. Artificial Intelligence and Japan's Computer Challenge to the World" by Edward Feigenbaum and Pamela McCorduck, Reading (Mass.), Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1983, XII + 275 pages; (II) "Japanese Electronics. A Worm's-Eye View of Its Evolution" by Makoto Kikuchi, Tokyo, The Simul Press, Inc., 1983, X + 209 pages]

[Text] The United States and Japan have been in a constant state of economic war in recent years. Electronics is now the scene of their fiercest battles. The intensification of technological and economic competition is connected primarily with the fact that this industry has become the main factor in the development of information technology and the creation of the new generation of industrial equipment, with which both countries associate far-reaching plans for the conquest of world markets.

For decades the American computer industry was inaccessible to the rest of the capitalist world: American firms dominated all national markets. In the 1970's, however, Japan quickly and confidently began to catch up with its main rival, and it is now equal or superior to the United States in terms of many indicators.

No other country, even in Western Europe with its traditionally high level of scientific and technical development, could have done this. Japan has already made similar breakthroughs in shipbuilding, the chemical industry and the automotive industry, and it is not surprising that many American experts are inclined to interpret the phenomenon of the "Japanese challenge" as a set of secrets carefully concealed from foreigners.

This is probably why Japan is being visited more frequently by American businessmen, scientists and politicians and why many books about Japanese technical achievements are being published in the United States. One of these was written by Stanford University Professor E. Feigenbaum and New York journalist P. McCorduck, renowned experts on "artificial intelligence." The main purpose of the book, as the authors define it in the introduction, is to convince the American scientific community that the "Japanese challenge" to the United States in the sphere of electronics is important and serious.

The book "Japanese Electronics," published in Tokyo, was written by M. Kikuchi, the Sony Company's research director. Prior to this, he held various key positions in the electrical engineering laboratory of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). Its purpose is to answer many of the questions Japanese scientists have been asked most frequently about the reasons for the rapid technological development of their country in the post-war period. Therefore, the books present two different views of the same phenomenon.

The authors of both books believe that mankind is on the threshold of revolutionary changes in computer technology: The further augmentation of data processing volumes and speed will facilitate the development of the fundamentally new systems known as "knowledge information processing systems" in Japan. This new generation of computers will be distinguished by the capacity to reason (I, p 8). It will be possible to communicate with them in ordinary language, with the aid of graphs, diagrams, printed texts, etc. Japan was the first of the developed capitalist countries to realize the importance of the imminent changes and it instructed its scientists to develop a new generation of computers.

M. Kikuchi worked in the United States for a long time and actively supports contacts with scientists from different countries. This gives him the ability to compare the development of electronics in Japan and in other countries. He believes that Japan caught up with the United States in terms of the level and scales of technological innovations in this sphere in the late 1970's. The gap was closed so quickly that many of the more far-sighted American managers were already worried in the 1960's. They hoped, however, that the United States would be able to retain its technological edge and use Japan only as a source of cheap but highly skilled labor.

This point of view was quite frankly expressed by the president of Philco, an American electrical equipment company, when he visited Japan in 1962: "If Japan wants to produce transistors, let it produce them.... The more it produces, the more it will sell and the more discounts the United States can expect" (II, p 85). The United States, on the other hand, was supposed to remain the scientific leader and "produce knowledge." But these dreams were not fated to come true. And in the project plans for the fifth-generation computer (1982-1992), Japan announced, for the first time in the history of this industry, the national goal of outdistancing the United States in the industry where it felt most confident.

When American experts analyze the Japanese experience, they try to project their own views and beliefs onto the extremely distinctive conditions of this country. They focus on the administrative role of the MITI. For example, E. Feigenbaum and P. McCorduck argue that the development of electronics in Japan cannot be discussed in isolation from its overall economic and technological policy. For more than 10 years a massive long-range program has been carried out in Japan under the auspices of the MITI for the establishment of a material and technical base for the so-called information society by the end of the current decade. Around 10 different major projects in the development of new computer systems, software, technology for the production of supersized

integral circuits and others were carried out for this purpose in the 1970's. The success of these projects brought Japanese computer manufacturers up to the level of computer production in the United States, and in 1982 they began work on the fifth-generation project.

M. Kikuchi objects to this view, which he regards as an oversimplification. He believes that Americans generally take a wrong turn in their search for the Japanese secret. An understanding of what has happened, he writes, first requires a clarification of the differences between the Japanese and West European cultures. Kikuchi himself became aware of these differences as a result of his frequent encounters with unfamiliar customs and mores in the countries he visited. The author discusses the well-known theory about the Japanese spirit of collectivism in contrast to European individualism (II, pp 151-154). He associates the development of the "spirit of collectivism" with the peculiarities of Japan's history, its insular state, its strong dependence on contacts with the outside world, etc. "We are all in the same boat," he writes about the Japanese (II, p 189). The underestimation of national cultural differences leads to incorrect conclusions, Kikuchi says. He cites examples of mistakes of this kind.

For example, a British parliamentary delegation studying the causes of high labor productivity in Japan concluded that the roots of the Japanese worker's "love" for his firm and his desire to work well for the sake of its prosperity lie in the fact that virtually all of his social benefits come only from his employer. This led to the conclusion that this is a temporary phenomenon and that the development of a governmental social infrastructure will be accompanied by the decline of the "spirit of collectivism" and of productivity growth rates (II, p 159). This, Kikuchi believes, is an example of superficial analysis and a misinterpretation of Japanese traditions.

Another example of an incorrect assessment can be found in the attempts of some Western experts to diminish the significance of Japan's technological achievements by asserting that the country has only been a consumer of the results of technological progress to date and that the Japanese are excellent imitators by their very nature but are incapable of independent discovery. Although Kikuchi acknowledges the seriousness of these arguments, he stresses that Japan's considerable scientific and technical potential is attested to by the very fact of its rapid mastery of the technology of transistor and integral circuit production. This would have been impossible without thorough research and development in related fields. He is inclined, however, to over-emphasize the subjective factor of the differing Japanese and American capacities for individual creative investigation and the incorporation of new achievements. In Kikuchi's opinion, the Japanese talent for creative adaptation has had a great impact (II, p 186). In recent years, for example, most of the patents for inventions in electronics were issued in the United States, but they have been used most effectively in Japan (II, p 158).

The entire book by E. Feigenbaum and P. McCorduck suggests that there is no excuse for American compacency. "We wrote this work because we are worried," they state in the introduction (I, p 3).

What is it that worries the American authors? Above all, it is the seriousness of the "Japanese challenge." The reader is informed that not one project included in the Japanese program for the "information society" has been a failure. An effective mechanism for the concentration of technological potential and material resources in the decisive areas of scientific and technical development was engineered during the course of these projects. It can coordinate the efforts of leading industrial firms under the supervision of government agencies. It is precisely this kind of effective management in the private sector that the United States does not have, in the opinion of E. Feigenbaum and P. McCorduck. America needs a national plan for the development of the computers of the future, they say. American businessmen must reconsider their traditional negative view of government regulation. If economic management in Japan produces such good results, why should this experience not be used in the United States? (I, p 3).

M. Kikuchi admits that the MITI performs an important function in the Japanese system of monopolist capitalism by serving as one of the important channels for the convergence and interaction of the monopolies and the state. He stresses that the MITI's role in Japanese economic development is indisputably great, but it cannot be called decisive (II, p 91). He mentions three groups of factors which he feels contributed to these results.

He believes that the main factors are the desire of Japanese monopolies to take revenge in the economic and technological spheres for the military defeat in World War II, and the skillful use of the nationalist feelings cultivated in Japanese society by ruling circles.

The second group of factors is connected, in Kikuchi's opinion, with the choice of the correct development strategy. Japanese strategy is based on the so-called marathon principle, which means that the winner in a long race does not have to be in the lead from the very beginning. He must stay behind the leader, conserving strength, and then beat him to the finish line by breaking into a dash at the decisive moment. But this requires more than just the will to win, which is nurtured in an atmosphere of nationalism and revanchism. It also requires strength and endurance, and Kikuchi believes that the Japanese are far superior to the Americans and the West Europeans in this respect. "The European culture is too calm and relaxed" (II, p 97)--this thesis is repeatedly reinforced in this book with various examples from the lives of the people of Europe and the United States. The author uses it to prove that the cultural climate is more favorable for technological innovations in Japan, and that this is why it is developing more quickly.

Therefore, according to the Japanese author's line of reasoning, his country has stayed in a secondary position because it is advantageous. Whenever necessary, it can call upon a burst of energy strong enough to overtake its main rivals. The foundations for this kind of forward dash, in M. Kikuchi's opinion, have already been laid: By the end of the 1970's, one-fourth of all of the reports at all international conferences on electronics were presented by Japanese scientists (II, p 119).

Americans have repeatedly informed their partners that the United States has incurred certain losses as a result of its position as the scientific and

technical leader of the capitalist world. They have felt that Japan should therefore compensate them for these losses by making larger "non-production" expenditures, mainly in the military sphere. Strong pressure has been exerted on Japan in this area.

Finally, Kikuchi associates the third group of factors with the fact that the U.S. electronics industry has reached a stage of maturity distinguished by the overall decline of the rates of technological progress. Japanese electronics, on the other hand, has not reached this stage yet, but is approaching it quickly, and each new step forward will entail much greater effort and expense. The Japanese author notes in particular that there have been virtually no reports of fundamental discoveries at international conferences on electronics since 1968, and that there are no longer any of the creative debates that were commonplace in the 1950's. Conference participants carefully and jealously keep an eye on one another and essentially discuss only ideas put forth in the past (II, p 115). The United States has imposed strict limitations on scientific contacts. Papers on electronics also began to be "classified" in Japan in 1977 (II, pp 145-146). The technological rivalry of these two countries has grown much more intense. Kikuchi also mentions another new development: Some of the new ideas of American scientists find no support in their own country. It is not until Japanese experts carry these ideas to the design and development stage that they are reconsidered in the United States. The most indicative example is the idea of the functional specialization of microprocessors, which was put forth by employees of Bell Laboratories and was ignored in the United States but was implemented successfully in Japan (II, p 133).

In turn, the American authors note that new projects in electronics entail a high risk. The risk is primarily connected with the need to solve a number of fundamental problems in the mathematical reliability of a new generation of computers. These problems are investigated within the scientific field known as "artificial intelligence." Japan is still lagging far behind in this field, and a qualitative breakthrough will require the accumulation of specific types of scientific potential and scientists capable of working on advanced "artificial intelligence" projects (II, pp 120-122). This will take time. It is no coincidence that Japan is now trying to attract scientists from overseas, especially from England, France and the FRG, where the problems of "artificial intelligence" have been investigated for decades.

It is obvious that any major economic conflict between the United States and Japan cannot be resolved completely without consideration for the third center of present-day imperialism--Western Europe. The Europeans are still wary of bilateral cooperation with Japan, and this, in the opinion of E. Feigenbaum and P. McCorduck, will put the realization of many of the long-range goals of the "Japanese challenge" in question.

The books analyzed in this review are interesting because they provide a sufficiently complete description of the socioeconomic and political background of the struggle between the leading economic powers of the capitalist world for leadership in the production of the latest information systems. This is eloquent testimony with regard to the increasingly acute conflicts

between them. As technical experts, however, the authors have provided an oversimplified description of the development of these conflicts. For example, instead of providing a socioeconomic analysis of the broad range of factors giving rise to the "Japanese challenge," M. Kikuchi discusses the national "spirit of collectivism," the distinctive features of Eastern culture, etc. For this reason, this book will not provide the Soviet reader with satisfactory answers to the author's own questions. Nevertheless, it does contain interesting observations and the "inside story" of much of what is now going on in Japanese science and technology.

E. Feigenbaum and P. McCorduck examine their topic in light of general trends in the development of technological knowledge. Ignoring the objective tendency toward the development of conflicts between capitalist countries, they arrive at the purely idealistic conclusion that American and Japanese scientists can unite their efforts in the creation of some kind of "kingdom of reason" (I, p 239).

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BOOK STRESSING NEED TO AVERT NUCLEAR WAR REVIEWED

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[Review by V. S. Anichkina of book "Novoye myshleniye v yadernyy vek" [A New Way of Thinking in the Nuclear Age] by Anatoliy Gromyko and Vladimir Lomeyko, Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, 1984, 292 pages; passages rendered in all capital letters printed in boldface in source]

[Text] This book by Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences Anatoliy Gromyko and Candidate of Historical Sciences Vladimir Lomeyko is significant primarily because of the point it makes: The current world situation and the unprecedented accumulation of nuclear weapons which can destroy our civilization on earth necessitate a new approach to issues of war and peace. And not only a new approach, but a new way of thinking. "We are living in a completely different age from the one in which the world of Ronald Reagan's beliefs and ideas took shape," the authors write. "The new age is distinguished by the presence of 'overkill,' or the equal capacity of both military blocs to destroy one another and all life on earth several times over. For this reason, nuclear war cannot solve a single political or social problem" (pp 17-18).

In a chapter entitled "How To Live in Order To Survive," the authors describe the situation in greater detail: Stockpiles of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction have laid the material foundation for the cessation of the human race's existence; the approximate balance of military power has turned nuclear war into suicide; the arms race, which has become a heavy burden for the developed countries and, in particular, for the developing states, entails colossal expenditures of material and intellectual resources; the present rates of the nuclear arms race are such that it could go out of control, and all of this heightens the probability of nuclear catastrophe; man's relationship to the environment has changed for the first time in human history; all human endeavor in the future will depend increasingly on the careful and solicitous treatment of nature (pp 209-210).

Consequently, objective reality itself has dictated the **NEED FOR A NEW WAY OF THINKING IN THE NUCLEAR AGE** to save mankind (emphasized in the book--V. A.). The authors recall that this was acknowledged by the builders of the atomic bomb when they analyzed data on its destructive power and the consequences of

its use. In 1955 the most prominent scientists signed the "Russell-Einstein Manifesto," a serious statement on the need to prevent nuclear war. The authors used a statement by Albert Einstein as one of the epigraphs for their books: "The survival and continued development of the human race will necessitate a new mode of human thinking. Today the atom bomb has changed the world dramatically; we are aware of this, and people must now think in ways corresponding to this situation."

This is being realized by an increasing number of scientists, politicians, statesmen and public spokesmen in the West and by the broadest segments of the general public. Today, in the middle of the 1980's, millions of people with the most diverse views and beliefs have joined the antinuclear movement and have come together under the slogan "Ban the nuclear bomb." This has been promoted by the colossal explanatory work of groups and centers researching the issues of war and peace and the publication of numerous works in which warnings are issued about the heightened danger of nuclear war. Anat. Gromyko and Vl. Lomeyko list some of the most serious studies, noting that they contain "many correct and sensible statements: acknowledgements of the increasing interdependence of our world and the need for all countries to cooperate in the resolution of today's global problems, to concern themselves about future generations and to abandon the arms race. The majority of useful statements, however, are either nullified by utopian and unrealistic recommendations (appeals for the renunciation of national sovereignty and the creation of a world government, etc.) or are undermined completely by appeals for the 'reorganization' of social systems, especially in socialist countries, which represent overt interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states" (p 213).

Western scientists with a sincere wish to find the correct response to the realities of the nuclear age have made an indisputably positive contribution. Their investigations--and this is underscored in the book--are helping in the establishment of a new way of thinking, corresponding to the requirements of our time. Studies of this kind, however, simply name the dangers of the accumulation of nuclear weapons, but "THEIR SOURCES MUST BE SEEN AND WAYS OF OVERCOMING THEM MUST BE SOUGHT" (p 213).

On the basis of their personal experience in participation in international meetings and discussions of issues of war and peace with foreign public spokesmen, the authors note the exceptional importance of a correct answer to the question "Who is to blame?" The source of the present threat to life on earth can be found in the continuous buildup of the most dangerous weapons of mass destruction. Who benefits from this continuous race? Who initiated it?

Several well-known and new facts are cited in the book to confirm that, "in the first place, the entire history of the arms race testifies that the USSR has never initiated the development of new weapon systems but has merely had to catch up with the United States; in the second place, the USSR has never drawn up plans for the first use of weapons, including nuclear ones, whereas the United States has elaborated both doctrines and plans for the actual use of nuclear weapons first, and against the USSR" (p 51).

What is dangerous is not only the accumulation and development of new weapons, but also the sense of omnipotence and impunity this arouses in the ruling circles of countries embarking on the road of militarization. This applies primarily to the United States (the book contains substantial criticism of the present policy line of the West German Government as well).

The authors present detailed analyses of the theories justifying the arms race, such as the theory that the arms race cannot be separated from technical progress (p 18), the ideas of the "acceptability" of nuclear war (pp 44-46) and "technological warfare" (p 87), the entire series of media-cultivated beliefs about the "aggressiveness" of the USSR, which portray it as "public enemy No 1" (pp 37, 78-79, 107), the thesis about "equal responsibility" (p 90) and others. Criticizing these concepts, which either justify the arms race or try to direct the antinuclear movement into a false channel, the authors continue, as it were, the heated debates of Soviet public spokesmen at international forums, who persistently and logically explain the real aims of the USSR's foreign policy and its peaceful proposals with the aim of curbing the arms race and preventing nuclear war. During the course of these debates, Soviet spokesmen have had to respond to the statements of professional anti-Soviets, who deliberately misrepresent Soviet foreign policy, and of the confused people whose view is obscured by three decades of NATO propaganda. In this context, the discerning analysis of many of the premises of anti-Soviet propaganda is of unquestionable practical value.

But the authors see their main goal as the demonstration of the absurdity and absolute unacceptability of the militarist line determining the approach of today's policymakers in Washington to world affairs. The authors list three main factors lying at the basis of this philosophy: the belief in the Americans as the chosen people with a historic mission (the psychological factor), the excessive reliance on force and the nation's lack of direct experience in the tragic implications of involvement in world wars (p 35).

In general, U.S. ruling circles are still thinking in obsolete political terms, but, according to these authors, attempts to find a new approach and a new way of thinking are making their way through the dense thicket of "cold war" stereotypes and postulates of power politics. In connection with this, the authors specifically mention the works of G. Kennan, the historian and diplomat who believes that the West "has no other alternative and must seek peaceful coexistence as the basis of its policy" (p 86). The analysis of the causes of the escalation of international tension in F. Holiday's book "The Second Cold War" conveys, in the authors' words, "a sense of the new way of thinking" (p 89). The authors also direct attention to the evolution of the views of Harvard Professor Emeritus G. Kistiakowsky, who was one of the builders of the atomic bomb. He "has acquired the conviction that the growing arsenal of nuclear weapons is becoming a genuine disaster for the United States and the rest of the world and has begun to speak out resolutely for nuclear disarmament" (p 149).

There are also other signs of an awareness of the need for a new way of political thinking in the nuclear age among political scientists, physicians, religious leaders, environmentalists and even former generals. "The new way

of thinking in the nuclear age presupposes an awareness of not only the lethal effects of nuclear war, but also the dangers of the nuclear arms race, which undermines the stability of world peace and brings the danger of atomic catastrophe closer" (p 163). The authors cite excerpts from the recommendations of the Palme Commission, drawn up by representatives of 17 countries: "The doctrine of common security must replace the now popular idea of intimidation with the aid of weapons."

The commission's conclusions and similar statements by many Western political and military leaders, the authors write, reflect the unavoidable and irreversible process of the maturation and establishment of the new way of thinking in the nuclear age in capitalist and developing countries.

These views are familiar and understandable to the Soviet people. They have long constituted the essence of Soviet foreign policy activity, which is based on Lenin's theory about the peaceful coexistence of states with differing social structures. This theory presupposes, as we know, the exclusion of war from international relations, the settlement of all disputes in peaceful ways and the development of international cooperation in the most diverse spheres with unconditional respect for sovereignty and the strictest observance of the equality of all states in all areas, including, naturally, the area of security.

Security in the nuclear age primarily means the cessation of the arms race. This is the belief of the Soviet leadership, whose statements and position are covered extensively in the book by Anat. Gromyko and V. Lomeyko (pp 145-146, 226-228, 231, 272-275). K. U. Chernenko's proposals regarding the joint acknowledgement by all nuclear powers of the standards of their interrelations, which would essentially guarantee the prevention of thermonuclear war, are discussed at length in the book. "The code of behavior proposed by the Soviet Union attests to our country's strong sense of responsibility for the future of human civilization and exemplifies the new way of thinking in the nuclear age" (p 274).

The possibility of nuclear war must be excluded. This is the essence of the new way of thinking and the main conclusion of the book.

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ROBERT DOLE, NEW REPUBLICAN SENATE MAJORITY LEADER

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 85 (signed to press 15 Feb 85) pp 119-120

[Article by Yu. K. Abramov]

[Text] After the Republicans in the Senate had considered all of the candidates for their new leader, they chose Senator R. Dole from the state of Kansas on 28 November 1984. He won this victory over his four main rivals: T. Stevens (Alaska), J. McClure (Idaho), P. Domenici (New Mexico) and R. Lugar (Indiana).

Robert Dole was born in 1923 in Russell, a small Kansas town surrounded by boundless wheat fields. His grandfather was a farmer and his father was a small businessman, the owner of a small restaurant on Russell's main street, and later the owner of a small elevator. Dole's mother sold sewing machines.

In 1943 Dole joined the Army, where he commanded a platoon, saw combat in Italy and rose to the rank of captain. He was awarded the Bronze Star and other medals and was wounded twice. Partially paralyzed by the second wound, he spent more than 3 years in the hospital. Although the doctors predicted that he would never be able to move again, Dole's persistence was rewarded: He began walking without crutches, but his right hand remained paralyzed.

Dole graduated from Washburn Municipal University in Topeka (Kansas) in 1952 with degrees in the liberal arts and law. When he was still a student, he ran for the Kansas state legislature on the Republican ticket and won the election. In 1952 Dole was elected Russell County attorney. In 1960 he won the race for the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress.

Dole's performance as a congressman (1961-1968) gave him a reputation as a "hard-line conservative." Along with other Republicans, he favored cuts in budget spending and voted against the Johnson Administration's social programs, against the subsidization of municipal public transport and against the "Medicare" program (for free medical treatment for the aged). The degree of Dole's conservatism is attested to by the fact that Americans for Democratic Action, a liberal organization, categorized his position as completely "unsatisfactory" four times in the 1960's. In discussions of civil rights, however, Dole took a position that was closer to the center than to the right.

Dole's name became familiar on the national level when he was elected to the Senate in 1968. He has been the most consistent supporter of the Nixon Administration's policies, and was appointed chairman of the Republican Party National Committee by Nixon in 1971. In this capacity, he was actively involved in the 1972 campaign and was instrumental in uniting various party factions in support of Nixon's re-election. Dole remained loyal to Nixon for almost the entire period of the Watergate investigations.

In 1974 Dole had to fight a hard battle for re-election to the Senate. His rival, W. Roy from Topeka, tried to incriminate Dole with statements about Dole's close contacts with Nixon. Dole won, but only by a slight majority (less than 2 percent). In 1975 he married E. Hanford, who was then a member of the Federal Trade Commission. In January 1983 Mrs. Dole was appointed secretary of transportation by Ronald Reagan.

In 1976 Dole accepted President Ford's offer to be his running-mate as candidate for the U.S. vice presidency. The failure of this campaign was the first defeat of Dole's political career.

In his almost 25 years in Congress, as a member of the House of Representatives and a senator, Dole has been on many of its committees and commissions.* As the representative of an agrarian state, he has taken a special interest in agriculture and has been a member of various committees in charge of agricultural affairs. In particular, between 1975 and 1978 he was the second-ranking member of the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry. In 1981 Dole became the chairman of the Senate Finance Committee. He is regarded as a member of the Republican Party conservative wing, although he has taken a quite flexible and pragmatic position on several political issues. In particular, expressing the interests of agrarian circles in his state, he was in favor of the cancellation of the embargo on wheat shipments to the USSR, which was injuring the interests of farmers, opposed the Republican line of cuts in social spending and worked with liberal Democrat G. McGovern. On the other hand, Dole was one of the co-chairmen of the rightwing Coalition for Peace from a Position of Strength, and after J. Buckley (the conservative Republican from New York) lost the race for the Senate in 1976, Dole took his place in the notorious commission for the oversight of the observance of the Helsinki Final Act, which has taken an overtly anti-Soviet stand.

In 1980 Dole was one of the contenders for the Republican presidential nomination, but he abandoned the race immediately after the New Hampshire primaries, when he was supported by only a few hundred voters, and joined the camp of Reagan's supporters soon afterward. He easily beat his Democratic opponent in the Senate race in 1980.

* In accordance with the established procedure in the Soviet press, our journal has always called the committees ["komitety"] in both houses of the U.S. Congress commissions ["komissii"]. This translation is not exactly accurate because Congress has select commissions as well as committees, and they should not be confused with its main standing bodies--the committees. The names of congressional bodies are translated accurately in publications of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies, and in 1985 our journal will also begin using the more accurate term "committee" in reference to standing congressional bodies--Editor's note.

Public attention has been focused on Dole, as the chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, during Reagan's years in office, now that the budget deficit and high interest rates have become the subject of heated political debates. In 1982 he was able to negotiate an acceptable compromise on several economic issues between various Republican and Democratic political groups in the Senate and representatives of the administration. Dole's role as a mediator between the administration and the Republicans in the Senate contributed to his nomination for the position of Republican majority leader.

In 1981 he promoted the approval of the tax cut bill by his committee, but now he is more likely to advocate "adjustments" in administration economic policy. He has suggested a slight increase in taxes to reduce the federal budget deficit.

Dole's position is determined in many respects by the interests of small and middle businessmen, who constitute the nucleus of his constituency.

The American press has called Dole one of the possible candidates for the U.S. presidency in 1988.

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